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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to investigate, design and implement a statistical 
analysis-based insider threat detection product deployable to resource-disadvantaged 
systems and provide organizations with a method for baselining the network profiles and 
host activities unique to their operational environments. Our system design seeks to alert 
the system and its operators to invest greater monitoring resources against hosts who 
exhibit threat characteristics of insider activity and prevent such activities from inflicting 
harm on the system and/or causing an information-loss event for the organization. This 
system provides an initial starting point for future work, implementing one means 
of detecting insider threat activities; this implementation results in best- and worst-
case detection rates of ~74% and ~68.2%, respectively, against our test data. We 
believe our framework provides a reasonable starting point for future work and 
improvement. 
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Systems responsible for detecting and responding to information system (IS) 
threats, especially those serving the United States Department of Defense (DoD), must be 
constantly updated and improved to remain abreast of advances in offensive methods and 
strategies. Of great concern, however, are the insider threats, those that do not necessarily 
meet malicious discovery thresholds and instead blend in with the normal activities of their 
respective organizations. In this thesis, we attempt to identify potentially malicious insider 
activity by developing a baseline of organizational activity and using this information to 
develop threat anomaly alerts for insider activity. Our ultimate goal is to utilize these 
collected activity attributes to develop a novel detection system framework and provide the 
basis for validation of its implementation and effectiveness against threat data. 
B. MOTIVATION 
Significant effort and expense have been spent protecting information systems from 
external malicious threats, but relatively little has been done to evaluate the actions of 
legitimate users to prevent them from engaging in malicious or otherwise damaging 
activity. As seen in the recent DoD leaks by Edward Snowden, Bradley Manning, and 
Reality Winner, the insider threat possesses significant destructive potential against 
national security, international relations, and global commerce interests [1]–[3]. While 
external threat protection systems, like antivirus software, are established to be viable 
threat prevention means and are ubiquitous on modern information technology (IT) 
systems, detection and prevention systems focused on insider threats and are far less 
common [4]. 
Previous work to improve insider threat detection and prevention includes efforts 
to apply existing frameworks and techniques to malicious activity detection, but they are 
disparate in their methods of classifying and assigning threat potential to the various user 
activity indicators. These differing means of describing malicious indicators and 
responding to threats are also often not applicable to the DoD due to the restrictions 
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imposed by network authorization/validation processes and concerns unique to national 
security systems. We seek to alleviate this issue by producing a systems-agnostic solution 
capable of detecting insider activity within any organization’s network without the need 
for integration or communications with any other external system.  
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In this thesis, we discuss the background and existing models for insider threat 
detection, and the process for designing and implementing a detection system on 
commodity platforms to support disadvantaged networks. In Chapter II, we present the 
history and motivation for our study, to include insider threat definition and impact, suspect 
threat identifiers and previous efforts to span the insider threat detection gap in both 
academia and the commercial realms. Our design methodology, as shown in Chapter III, 
details our method of profiling system operations from available network and host data and 
the characteristics identified for inclusion in our detection system. In Chapter IV, we 
present our proof-of-concept detection system and discuss initial results against available 
threat data. Finally, in Chapter V we present our research conclusions and provide 
recommendations for future work. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION—THE INSIDER THREAT 
Insider threat activities are “an insider’s action(s) that puts at risk an organization’s 
data, processes or resources in a disruptive or unwelcome way” [5]. These actions can take 
the form of physical thefts, electronic exfiltration of data, the installation and control of 
malicious logic, or a host of other actions. The key component of any insider threat is the 
misuse of privilege or access by a trusted member of an organization [6].  
Insider threats are critical threats against any business type, including the 
commercial sphere where 60% of fraudulent activities and 21% of all cyber-attacks against 
organizations are perpetrated by insiders [6]. More insidiously, the 2018 Insider Threat 
Report stated that 90% of the organizations represented in their study were vulnerable to 
insider activity due to the large number of unsecured/untracked mobile devices attached to 
their networks and the large body of users with privileges far above those required for their 
job functions [7]. These threats are not limited to commercial targets, as the actions of 
Edward Snowden, Bradley Manning and Reality Winner clearly showed [1]–[3]. With the 
significance of insider threat clearly established, it follows that attempts to categorize, 
detect and defeat insider threat activity has been researched and financed similarly to 
conventional efforts to disrupt the actions of external actors. As such, the DoD has 
established the “DoD Insider Threat Program” in an attempt to “develop and maintain an 
insider threat program to comply with the requirements and minimum standards to prevent, 
deter, detect, and mitigate the threat insiders may pose to DoD and U.S. Government 
(USG) installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or resources” [8].  
However, as explained by Cole and Ring, many organizations do not clearly 
understand or consider inherently dangerous the threat posed by insiders, and that there are 
significant repercussions associated with identifying oneself as the victim of insider 
misconduct [4]. Additionally, the inherent nature of the insider threat creates great 
difficulty in identifying and isolating their actions from those of a benign, legitimate user. 
In fact, there is an increasing trend in unintentional insider threat activities, due to user 
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ignorance, poor training and adherence to policies, and the pervasive intrusion of 
Information Systems (IS) into previously unconnected or sensitive realms [9]. These 
difficulties create an extreme barrier in developing systems to detect and prevent insider 
activities. 
Ultimately, anyone with trusted, privileged access to information within an 
organization is a vector for insider threat activity, whether intentional or not [6], [10]. As 
defined by the Carnegie Mellon University Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CMU-
CERT), insiders can be intentional or unintentional; while the unintentional threat is not in 
malice, its action nonetheless “substantially increases the probability of … serious harm to 
the … organization’s resources or assets” [11]. With that fact established, when 
investigating the indicators and data associated with insider threat detection, operators must 
consider the behavior of users both in isolation and against the whole; with any member of 
an organization a potential threat vector, all activity is suspect. As opposed to the signature-
based detection methodology used by many Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), there are 
no true “signatures” for insider threats due to their unique status. This refers to the fact that 
insiders may appear benign in their activities, their typical activities are likely within the 
bounds of an employee’s expected normal behavior and their actions are differentiated only 
by the maliciousness of their intent or specific actions that traditional detection systems 
may disregard. To counter this target profile, any effective detection system for insider 
activity must employ a method of inductive analysis to establish a baseline for an 
organization’s inherent operational attributes, in order to identify disparate activities of 
their organizational populace and discover potential threats.  
B. DEFINING INDICATORS AND DETECTING OUTLIERS 
1. Anomalous Network Activity 
There has been significant investment in exploring the network activity aspect of 
identifying and combatting the insider threat. With these efforts, the underlying assumption 
is that there exists some explicit indication of wrongdoing or improper activity. Some 
suspected indicators of insider activity include web traffic with questionable destinations, 
email gauges such as recipients and attachments, network traffic measurements and 
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network functionality interactions such as remote file system queries, inter-domain 
interactions, and administrative function use [4]–[6], [8]. Importantly, previous works have 
placed significant emphasis on identifying quantitative measurements of the monitored 
actions or activities themselves, including concepts such as volumetric and temporal 
characteristics of the activity [12]–[14]. These indicators, when taken together, serve as the 
basis for identifying outliers or anomalies within an organization, which can be used to 
signal malicious activities by an outside threat or by insider activities.  
Maloof and Stephens, of Georgetown University and the MITRE Corporation, 
respectively, conducted research into detecting violations of user need-to-know and 
developed the ELICIT system as a means to monitor for and prevent insider misuse of 
resources for malicious activities, with specific emphasis on network activities [12]. Their 
patented method provided “methods, systems, and computer products for insider threat 
detection,” specifically to “detect network activity…to detect volumetric anomalies, 
suspicious and/or evasive behavior” [13]. The network attributes collected include the 
protocol in use, IP addresses, packet time and size metrics, and information about the user 
and resources in use [12]. Their method provides a central directory that stores and 
associates attributions for each user, comparing collected information against known 
patterns of misuse, as well as a user’s “past information-use activity”; these comparisons 
feed a probability distribution function that provides an alert when a user’s behavior falls 
below the existing threshold [13]. The system then processes this information through a 
Bayesian network to assign a threat score for each user, ranking all users on the network 
from most-to-least threatening [13].  
The network sensors suggested by Maloof and Stephens “transform the packets 
[collected] into information-use events” by classifying events into eight discrete actions 
based on observed network activity: file listings, file reads, file writes, file deletes, sending 
emails, using search engines, printing, and moving files or directories [12]. In addition, 
their sensor network constructed social network maps from the information to provide 
greater granularity for use-case analysis; however, the sensors only monitor the local 
network; they do not collect information on packets traversing to/from the Internet due to 
privacy concerns [12]. The system attempts to assign each event to a user, but many events 
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(such as unauthenticated system shares) may not contain or require explicitly attributable 
information. For these unattributed events, the system uses a “nearest-neighbor method” 
based on active time, system/network locality and other weighted methods to link 
attributable events to the unattributed event based on surrounding actions [12], [13].  
This collected information is compared against the existing body of data for both 
the individual user and the network as a whole to determine if it is anomalous against alert 
definitions for “volumetric anomalies, suspicious behavior, and evasive behavior”; this is 
determined using the times, locations and characteristics of the suspicious information-use 
event. These use-event alerts include blacklisted search terms, such as “proprietary” or 
“sensitive,” activities such as printing to non-local printers, and “anomalous browsing 
activity.” Each of these alert definitions feeds into the system’s Bayesian ranking network, 
which develop a risk score of the event and user based on the event’s severity/association 
with insider activity and how anomalous it is in context [12], [13].  
In other work, the Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA) tool provides an 
integrated information ingest methodology when paired with the Splunk Core product [14]. 
UBA is designed to work with the Core as a primary ingest point, but can be configured to 
use a wide array of other sources, including host operating system logs, network traffic 
indicators and volumetric/temporal analysis [15]. Anomalous network activity, as 
compared to the baseline or current model, is used to develop alerts or adjust the 
observation model. This tool digests data in realtime, both testing it against existing 
baselines and developing/adjusting baselines; it operates with a 30/60/90-day comparison 
scope, enabling trends analysis beyond its current baseline. This method of updating 
baselines and models as a real-time function, i.e. maintaining running models beyond the 
“established” baseline and retaining previous versions for historic comparison, results in a 
very CPU-intensive product, limiting the product’s placement on network infrastructure 
nodes vice user devices. Additionally, UBA produces and maintains multiple models for 
each use-case, which seeks to increase the likelihood of detecting potentially malicious/
anomalous behavior, however, this modeling method drastically increases the processing 
and memory requirements of the product [14].  
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The system proposed by Legg, Buckley, Goldsmith and Creese in 2015 represents 
“a synthetic approach for insider threat detection and analysis based on … anomaly 
detection” by describing a method of defining normal operations using activity log data 
from an organization’s network [16]. The system examines historic “computer-based 
access logs, email and web records and physical building access records,” from which they 
generate a “daily observed profile” for each user [16]. Using this data, they creates a series 
of “anomaly assessment scores” to identify groups of suspicious activities based on 
deviation from a user’s normal profile and that of others in their assigned job role [16]. 
Based on their previous work on a conceptual model of the insider threat, they used the 
elements discovered to define the targets of their system, a threat impact score for 
anomalous behavior, and a means to classify individual user threats based on deviation 
from the user’s own baseline and job role [6], [16]. This system provides a high level of 
granularity and continually updates its knowledge of user baseline activities, preventing a 
portion of false-positives over time due to the large body of data; however, its use of role-
based data could potentially result in skewed results [16]. An alternative method of 
describing network data is suggested by Dean in his “Systematic Assessment of the Impact 
of User Roles on Network Flow Patterns” in 2018. In his work, he established that a user’s 
network activity can be better monitored for anomalous behavior by comparing it to all 
near-peers, regardless of job or user role, as roles and network activity have been shown to 
be relatively unrelated [17]. 
Shaghaghi et al. presented another model for managing risk created by the insider 
threat with their GARGOYLE system, in which they integrated their monitoring and 
response modules into a Software Defined Network (SDN) construct. Their methodology 
includes restricting data object and network access via functionally based access control 
rules, effectively locking resources against exposure and misuse [18]. Their system 
accomplishes this by dynamically inspecting and segregating network traffic based on 
membership to various access groups and current network/user activity. Their system 
accounts for the increasing propensity for bring-your-own-device (BYOD) policies by 
requiring all such devices to manage requests for network resources through an additional 
management level. This management entity then monitors the device’s location, activity 
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and user presence, restricting access to resources depending on the risk posed by the 
device’s situation as defined by current physical or logical operating environment, the 
policies in place for that environment and requested resources [18]. This system seeks to 
be comprehensive in its coverage of network activity and file access requests, but does not 
maintain and utilize a robust means of detecting insider threat activity as a unique 
occurrence; rather, the system seeks to protect data and segregate user activity into 
approved zones instead of searching only for malicious activity. While it does gather data 
useful in identifying potential insider threats, the system uses these attributes to restrict 
access and enforce network/host policies to prevent misuse and requires an extensive 
repository of network/user rules for proper enforcement [18]. This system also requires 
integration into an existing SDN configuration and a potentially comprehensive re-
engineering of network flow and user activity paths, possibly causing at least significant 
short-term disruption in operations. 
2. Host-Based Indicators 
Along with network-based indicators, research has also focused on host-based 
indicators for insider threat activities. Some system activities that could be identified as 
prospective threats include file system use, process executions, and system call activity. A 
study by Liu developed a method to track system calls specifically related to these 
indicators, which granted them the ability to monitor all activity conducted by the insider’s 
host [19]. This effort used existing methods for detecting anomalies associated with 
external malicious threats and attempted to apply them to insider threats; overall, they 
determined that “feature representations … for the external threat do not perform as well 
for insider [threats]” [19]. However, they did determine that some existing features from 
external threats had potential to be developed into representations of insider activity 
detectable via their system call method [19]. Building upon this work, Kanaskar developed 
a monitoring system based on employee “system usage profile[s]” defining “system usage 
patterns … in terms of system calls” [20]. This method used Dynamical System Theory to 
develop a model of system user activities based on a deterministic set of discrete states. By 
studying the application environment of a user, their method develops an expected model 
of system activity based on the various applications and activities conducted by the user in 
9 
their normal operation [20]. This model uses an “approximate entropy” measure to evaluate 
the various state transition likelihoods between the user’s various application states across 
the system, allowing for development of expected or normal models of how a user or 
application should normally progress through states of operation, creating another means 
of anomalous behavior detection [20]. This system, while developmental, was successful 
in detecting “abnormal system dynamics” and indicating that anomalous behavior was 
occurring, which might integrate with insider threat detection systems; however, while 
useful for insider detection, this method is not restricted to the insider threat, as it 
theoretically can detect anomalous behavior regardless of source [20]. 
Columbia University researchers proposed a means of detecting insider threat host 
activities using a three-tiered system that deceives malicious actors and monitors potential 
insider activities at the network and host levels [21]. Their method relies on an extensive 
system architecture to develop, generate and monitor the use of various types of decoy 
documents, and integrate host-based sensors. Most interestingly, their host-based sensors 
perform user host activity baselining and work with network monitors to “combine 
multiple views of the same event” in an attempt to reduce false-positive rates [21]. At the 
host level, they developed a suite of host sensors known as “Are You You (RUU)” that 
profiles user activities to “isolate behavior differences over time,” providing a means to 
detect and compare anomalous behavior in host actions [21]. When a decoy document is 
activated, the system begins to report its use to the monitoring network, identifying the 
target host of interest, and logging information about the user and the interactions 
happening at the host level. Their deployment model relies on the idea that not all insiders 
pose the same risk as others, noting that based on the “levels of insider sophistication and 
capability,” different users will be more or less inclined to be fooled by the decoys, 
bypassing part of their detection system and acting outside the system’s purview [21]. 
However, their system is somewhat limited in its scope of detection in that only 10 seconds 
of user activity is used to form a baseline, and the system only monitors user search activity 
for anomalous behavior.  
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3. Baselining Operations 
Whether for network or host-based monitoring, there is a clear requirement to 
properly baseline system activities; without a baseline for comparison, no anomalous 
detection method can identify activities that are outside the norm. For a composite 
detection system, the designer must integrate both network and host data to develop a 
usable target baseline for each user/host threat possibility, whether it be a low-level user, a 
system administrator or some other power user. For network baselining, a system must 
gather historic data on the network’s activity overall and the specific attributes for each 
user. As with intrusion detection, these attributes must be properly categorized based on 
proximity to similar factors and classified into discrete labeled qualities [22]. Effective 
baselining must collect significant data from network traffic, including user roles, 
destinations, volumes, and temporal data points to “detect volumetric anomalies, 
suspicious and/or evasive behavior” [12], [16].  
In the Bowen study, researchers described a system that profiles user activities 
based on host data from “file accesses, windows registry accesses, dynamic library loading, 
and window access events” to develop unique file system search patterns for each user that 
can be used in anomaly detection. They stated that “wider and deeper and in a less targeted 
manner,” search activity could be indicative of threat behavior [21]. In addition to search 
activity, the Bowen monitor collected data on various system attributes such as process 
creation patterns and timing; if the Dynamical System method used by Kanaskar were 
integrated with the data gathered by the Bowen monitor, a viable means of creating a 
baseline of system activity by system call analytics could be generated [20], [21]. 
4. Model Interoperability 
Also important are the methods used to describe and define the various attributes 
and indicators of insider threat activity. Each detection methodology covered in the 
preceding sections described a unique means to measure and detect insider activity, but 
they do not share a common set of representations or measurement criteria. Therefore, the 
various models are not inherently interchangeable due to their individual methods of 
categorizing and representing the various data points used in their work.  
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As Magklaras and Furnell noted, there exist within the intrusion detection field 
clear lexicons for threat characteristics; these include the Common Intrusion Specification 
Language (CISL) and the Panoptis language [23]. These standards exist to provide a 
common means to classify and report on potential threats, creating frameworks for 
interoperability between IDS products and the operating systems and networks on which 
they reside; they “bridge the gap between language semantics and operating system/IDS 
product implementation” [23]. They define in their work the process of threat estimation 
which takes as inputs “Insider Threat Qualification Attributes” (ITQA), which are 
designer-specified user characteristics that delineate the characteristics of normal users 
across various detection levels and user types (network activity, host utility, process 
execution, group membership) that hold differing threat weights that feed their model. 
Using various weights and these inputs, their “Estimated Potential Threat” (EPT) function 
develops a quantifiable classification category based on likelihood of maliciousness. Their 
work on EPT also produced a matrix describing the various ITQAs, their weights and the 
potential meanings of the entries. They used this matrix to develop a clear language for 
insider threat detection activities, similar to those available within the IDS community. 
Their intent with the “Insider Threat Prediction Specification Language” (ITPSL) was to 
provide a means to standardize the various threat characteristics and be a link between 
different threat models and disparate detection vectors. Development of signatures using 
ITPSL definitions, which could then be used across various systems or activities, enables 
clearer integration of various methodologies and models for combatting the insider threat 
[23]. 
C. COMPOSITE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
While various methods and models for detecting and responding to insider threat 
activities exist in the academic, commercial and governmental realms, each has its own 
shortcomings and strengths. If the beneficial attributes of these disparate detection systems 
were combined into a single detection system, the resulting composite system could bridge 
their individual detection gaps and provide a more comprehensive means to monitor the 
potential indicators of insider threat activity. 
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1. Identifying Design Shortcomings 
While many of the aforementioned detection methods provide extensive means for 
monitoring insider threat indicators, they often require considerable computing resources 
due to the extent of their monitoring. For example, the Splunk UBA product requires 
significant processing and memory resource allocation for its operation; this is due to 
UBA’s maintenance of multiple threat models for each potential threat use-case and its 
real-time ingestion of network data while conducting comparisons and model manipulation 
using this data [14]. Similarly, GARGOYLE necessitates the use of SDN architecture, 
directing network flow and user activity paths across the monitored control plane 
infrastructure for monitoring and interaction; this potentially requires the complete 
redesign of existing infrastructure systems, significantly affecting operations [18].   
Detection systems are inherently sensitive to target awareness of monitoring 
efforts; if the observed population knows the means by which an organization or 
monitoring system is tracking their activity, there exists the potential to subvert such 
efforts. Bowen acknowledges this when defining the various levels of sophistication within 
the insider threat continuum [21]. In their definitions, insiders vary from levels of low 
sophistication to highly privileged users; while low category users likely will not possess 
the levels of understanding or access to perceive the monitoring methodology in use, those 
on the other end of the spectrum likely will [21].  
Furthermore, when dealing with anomaly detection systems, there must be adequate 
data for the creation of representative baselines. In the Bowen design, by limiting the 
baseline data to 10 seconds of monitoring after system initialization without clear historic 
analysis of past baselines, a sophisticated insider aware of these limitations could bypass 
the safeguards and proceed unimpeded [21]. In order to avoid these types of weaknesses 
regarding baseline data, an extended snapshot of activity must be gathered, but the line 
between too much and too little can be difficult to find. 
An additional key shortcoming in many of these commercial and academic 
detection/prevention designs is that they require significant alteration to an organization’s 
existing network and security design, and may require a complete redesign of how the 
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network manages its day-to-day operations regarding how resources are used. The DoD 
does not make such changes without a long review process comprised of rigorous testing 
and validations, potentially spanning several years of additional proving activities. With 
the sensitivity and criticality of these systems, it is understandable that the organization 
may be hesitant to adopt new technologies without extensive effort to ensure both 
effectiveness and security [24], [25]. As such, most of these designs are not viable for DoD 
systems; however, by augmenting the systems present on DoD assets to fill gaps in 
approved Programs of Record (POR), some of the most promising features from these 
various designs could be integrated into existing security architectures. 
2. Synthesis 
Although each previous methodology carries potential shortcomings and 
weaknesses, they all provide significant strengths that are prime for synthesis into a new 
product, which delivers a more comprehensive method of detecting insider threats while 
avoiding the design limitations of its parents.  If taken individually as transitional tools or 
architectural design primitives, a developer using these separate design methodologies 
could effectively bridge the various gaps and synthesize a new method of adapting to and 
prosecuting the insider threat, which we will propose and describe in our later Chapters. 
D. SUMMARY 
This review introduced existing research regarding insider threat detection efforts, 
both in the commercial sphere and in academics. We described current literature 
concerning insider threat characteristics analysis and proposed detection schemes. This 
chapter further identified potential shortcomings and difficulties encountered with these 
various methodologies, including concerns with the current DoD security environment, 
both in developing an effective security system and overcoming the administrative hurdles 
for validation and program acceptance. For this work, we proposed integrating various 
existing detection methodologies to develop a new system for detecting and preventing 
insider threat activities, which we further explain and present in the following chapters.  
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III. BASELINE METHODS AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION—ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR SYSTEM 
ACTIVITY BASELINES 
As stated in Chapter II, the insider threat is a pervasive reality in both the 
commercial and governmental spheres. When considering its potential effects, one cannot 
ignore some of the most recent insider events in U.S. Government (USG) operations, 
specifically by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community including Edward Snowden, 
Bradley Manning, Reality Winner, and Harold Martin [1]–[3], [26]. The USG entrusted 
each of these individuals with incredibly sensitive information and accesses, which they 
used to inflict grave damage to both the international image of the United States and the 
operations of the United States Intelligence Community [1]–[3], [26]. While there are 
considerable oversight issues with these individuals, beyond systems access and use, each 
used their Information System (IS) access to find and steal information from their 
respective organizations [1]–[3], [26].  
In the commercial sector, while there may not be individuals with the same 
household infamy, the impact of the insider threat is still significant [7]. The 2018 Insider 
Threat Report by Cybersecurity Insiders indicates that 90% of administrators consider their 
organizations susceptible to the insider threat, and 51% estimate that an insider breach 
would result in a greater-than $100,000 loss [7]. The 2018 Ponemon report on insider threat 
costs found that the organizations in the study suffered between $280,000 and $650,000 in 
direct damage from these incidents, depending on the type of threat profile, defined as 
employee negligence (~$280,000 average loss), criminal or malicious insider ($~600,000 
average loss) and credential theft (~$650,000 average loss) [27]. This loss consists of direct 
monetary damage to the IS and intellectual property (IP) theft, but second-order damages 
caused by loss of brand prestige, contractual or liability concerns, and reduced trust from 
customers cannot be easily measured and would arguably be comparable in severity to the 
direct monetary loss [7], [9], [27]. Additionally, while the difference in motivation between 
a witting and unwitting insider is important, administrators should not separate their 
policies based on this distinction, as the unwitting insider’s impact can be as great as or 
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greater than that of the witting, deliberate threat [6], [10]. By definition, “any person who 
has some legitimate privileged access to internal digital resources, [or] anyone who is 
allowed to see or change the organization’s computer settings, data, or programs in a way 
that arbitrary members of the public may not” must be considered a candidate for insider 
threat [28]. 
There is a need for consolidated detection systems triggered by anomalous or 
malicious user and network activity across all industry areas. Within such a system, we 
previously referred to two areas within an IS that have potential to provide insider threat 
alerts: host-based and network-based activity indicators, specifically those that prove 
anomalous to the established IS baselines. Network-based indicators refer to those network 
attributes of a network considered to have merit in developing a model of normal behavior, 
and that are tied to variance in a user’s normal operations; an example of this is network 
volume metrics, which provide insight to the activity levels of a user on the organization’s 
infrastructure [10], [12], [18]. Host-based indicators, as the name implies, are those related 
to a user’s actions and effects on his/her host system, relative to the operational 
requirements of their position; examples include application use, file system activity, and 
interaction with hardware resources [16], [19], [21]. Unfortunately, in order for these 
indicators to be useful in a detection system, there must first exist an effective and 
comprehensive IS-specific baseline for use in the anomalous characteristic comparison. 
This baseline is difficult to establish and validate across disparate organizational systems 
due to the significant differences and nuances present in different IS environments. 
However, we believe that implementing a generalized, systems-agnostic approach could 
successfully bridge this gap. To prove this concept, we suggest several elements below that 
we later integrate into our example detection system. 
B. PLAN DESCRIPTION 
1. Profiling User and Network Data 
The core concept of our detection system is to develop dynamic profiles of the 
“normal” activities of an organization’s networks and users. Without these profiles, our 
system will have no activity baseline for comparison, preventing meaningful analysis of 
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emerging trends or potentially anomalous actions. Based on categorical distinctions 
between host and network-based data, we outline several metrics below that are effective 
for building these activity baselines, namely, network data metrics, host activity metrics, 
and user role analytics, as seen in Table 1.  
Table 1. Anomaly Metrics and Sources 
Metric Type Measured Attributes Example Metric Metric Source 
Network Traffic time, volume, 
type and destination 
measurements 
Average daily flow 
size for a target host 
to a given destination 
type 
Collection nodes 
resident on network 
infrastructure 
Host Application use, system 
call activity and time 
measurements 
List of applications 
commonly used on a 
target host 
Collection nodes 
resident on each 
network host 
User Role Correlation or application 
use and network activity 
to user group norms  
Average daily flow 
size for a host in a 
given user role group  
Organizational user 




Regarding network data, we considered the following attributes significant for this 
requirement: temporal characteristics, volume metrics, traffic destination inspection, and 
protocol analysis. Of note, considering the potentially critical resource requirements of 
monitoring the contents of each packet within an organization’s network, we believe that 
the use of a NetFlow-style record system will provide our design with the baseline utility 
and detail required to detect anomalous behavior while significantly reducing the 
processing and memory requirements [29]. We acknowledge that some fine-grained 
network details such as data content and specific external site details will be lost; however, 
this information is not directly attributed to our system at this time. Using this flow record 
method, we obtain patterns of life for the various hosts on the network, particularly related 
to work cycles and periods of peak activity. These temporal characteristics give direct 
insight to the normal operations of the organization’s network, providing an indicator 
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source for anomalous activity based on the previous observed active times for target hosts. 
Similarly, volume metrics are relatively simple to measure and account for with this flow 
method, and our system’s presence on infrastructure within the organization’s network 
makes access readily available. This volume metric is used to identify statistically 
significant anomalous behavior in terms of the volume of data movement within the 
network, which could be indicative of exfiltration behavior or the positioning of 
information for malicious use at a more opportune time [12].  
Similar to our rationale with regard to volume metrics granularity, when inspecting 
destination characteristics of network activity, we are concerned with whether traffic is 
going to an internal or external destination and, if an internal destination, its category and 
sensitivity. As such, our system does not baseline traffic against external destinations by 
site, as the internal destination is more significant for monitoring resource use within the 
network; however, the system does check against an operator-defined “dirty-list” of 
external sites, providing direct indication of insider wrongdoing.  
To obtain user activity metrics, we investigate the suitability of two attributes to 
feed our system’s baseline process: temporal characteristics and host activity analysis. 
Similar to network temporal characteristics above, examining the activity levels of a user 
over time has the potential to provide insights into a user’s “normal” behavior concerning 
both types of activities and general system use. An example of such a behavior abnormality 
is the case of a 9AM-5PM user conducting network activities late at night, potentially 
indicating an attempt to hide malicious activity; by including these time bounds on activity 
analysis, we characterize the user’s routine, adding a level of fidelity that may be lost by 
focusing solely on the activities themselves. Additionally, our method includes attributes 
of the user’s direct host-based actions across two main lines of effort: the use of network 
resources and host application use.  
To monitor such host-based actions, our system receives and characterizes host 
system functions via inspection of the various system calls made on the target node; of 
particular interest are the calls to open/modify filesystem resources, search activities, 
networking operations, and process creation. These particular activities are notable due to 
their direct potential for misuse during an insider event, providing the insider access to 
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materials or information targeted for theft or manipulation and the capability to traverse 
the organization’s network or initiate potentially malicious logic on their hardware [19]. 
This system call monitoring is accomplished through interaction with established auditing 
procedures on the target host, such as the Linux Audit system [30]. Reported events include 
the call made, the target of the call, and relevant arguments to specific calls. In order to 
limit the number of calls monitored, the specific system calls of concern are currently 
limited to file operations (open, read, write, chown, chmod, mkdir, etc.), network 
operations (socket, connect, send, receive, bind, listen), process manipulation (fork, 
execve, kill), and external hardware operations (printers, removable media, etc.). For 
example, if a user modifies a file, the write call and the targeted file would be reported to 
the system, along with the size of the write being made. These reports form each user’s 
host activity profile, providing the system with the basis for comparing changes in a 
network operator’s behavior, which gives insight into potential data manipulation or 
excessive/unbounded search activity.  
Regarding user roles, Dean’s 2017 study found that network activity comparisons 
between members with the same static user role (administrators, human resources, etc.) 
were not useful in discerning the user role identity of a given target profile [17]. As such, 
this type of user membership provides no benefit to profile generation in our system. 
However, by using a method similar to that described by Dean to create new “behavior-
defined-user groups,” we seek to operationalize that study’s findings, specifically the use 
of K-means++ to “cluster … feature vectors” and create representative user groups based 
on these similarities [17]. To accomplish this user group creation, we develop clusters of 
user data based on network time and volume data and the number of system calls per hour, 
generating distinct groupings [17]. These user groupings provide another statistical 
measurement for outlying data, similar to the Neighborhood Outlier Factor from the 2015 
study by Jabez, giving an indication of the behavior’s deviation from the user’s established 
closest neighbor grouping [17], [31].  
User roles do, however, help in determining whether the specific activities of a user 
are suspicious or inherently anomalous. Specifically, the types of applications used and 
internal destinations visited are indicators of group membership; for example, the use of 
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system administrator applications or commands by a standard user can indicate malicious 
activity if that user’s work role does not require such tools [32]. By comparing a user’s 
given work role to their application usage, the system can immediately flag activities that 
are questionable, and alert for administrative action. Given that each organization will have 
idiosyncratic requirements for their various user roles, these inherently anomalous 
behaviors must be configurable to match the organization’s needs throughout the system’s 
lifecycle.  
Having described relevant classification criteria for both network and user data to 
form our target profiles, we develop representative baselines for use in our anomaly 
detection engine; by expanding beyond traditional categories and including additional data 
points, we believe that anomalous behavior will be captured more faithfully while 
minimalizing false results.  
2. Generating Baselines 
To generate useful baselines for the disparate data collected, we split the data into 
two bins: host-based data, and role-based data. Each host is designated its own baseline for 
network and host-based activities, providing a direct representation of that individual host 
for any data type collected by our system. We identify the data points within these two host 
baseline categories by day and hour, to order them chronologically. Lastly, we generate 
generic user activity groups, via the method used in Dean’s work to discern user group 
clusters with similar network activity using K-Means++ clustering, for use with collected 
user data to provide another comparison against expected behavior [17]. 
For these three baseline types (network activity, host-based activity, and cluster 
activity comparison) we construct an array of “neighborhood clusters” as described in 
Jabez’s 2015 study [31]. These clusters are generated by determining the “distance” 
between data points; for example, a neighborhood could be 10,000 packets whose sizes are 
within 1B of each other [31], [33]. Using these clusters, we discard outlying data, whose 
distance from the baseline’s clusters is greater than the distance between members of any 
other cluster. This data sanitization pre-processes the baselines for use, assuming that these 
outliers are results of irregular network conditions irrelevant to the overall model and may 
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otherwise introduce unintended results. Additionally, we find the data distribution’s 
density bounds, indicating various values that fall within different quantile ranges of the 
distribution (i.e., those that encompass 90% of the distribution, then 50% of the 
distribution, and so forth) [34]. These findings form the primary foundation for our 
anomaly detection engine, as described later in this Chapter.  
 Generation of the baselines must occur against a body of normal system activity in 
order to provide an accurate representation of the target system [16], [21]. However, too 
large a period could result in anomalous activity being represented as “normal” in the 
operational baseline, reducing the system’s ability to respond to threats. Conversely, too 
short a period will likely result in a greater false-positive rate, due to the lack of 
comparative information available to the system. We suggest that an initial baseline period 
of two weeks provides an ideal representation of network operations; we believe that the 
two-week baseline is ideal, as it provides multiple data points for each measurement and 
will help prevent potential false-positive results by smoothing the data ingested by the 
baseline. By starting with a two-week sample covering 24 hours of operations each day, 
the system begins with a complete representation of the organization’s activities, assuming 
the observed weeks are considered “normal” for the organization. After generating this 
baseline, we update the data every week, weighting the existing baseline’s values at 85%, 
as compared with 15% for any new data.  
3. Identifying Inherently Anomalous Behaviors 
Beyond system call activity level, there are several specific system calls that are 
inherently dangerous, and potentially indicative of unusual user activity. Among these are 
calls used for system manipulation or administrative actions, such as sysctl, chown or 
mmap, system operations monitoring such as strace or ptrace, and interaction with security 
modules such as seccomp or selinux modification. Without a valid reason for these various 
system requests, any of these requests could be indicative of a malicious user or potentially 
a system compromised by some other malicious entity. As such, these requests are innately 
suspicious and will not be considered “normal” activity for any user without intervention 
from a system administrator or membership in the administrator group [5], [6], [19]. 
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In addition to the host-based malicious indicators, network indicators also exist that 
are inherently suspicious. For this system, we are concerned with indicators that correlate 
to malicious tool activity, such as DNS queries to external sources, IRC activity, etc., or 
use of dangerous protocols, such as SSH or telnet outside of established administrative 
norms, file transfers to external destinations, etc. To protect against these activities, we 
define a new threat set that includes these various actions and network indicators, and 
similar to the dangerous host activities, any time an instance of this threat set is present on 
the network, our system always considers such activity anomalous, barring the approval of 
a legitimate administrator [12], [20]. 
4. Detecting Anomalies 
In 2014, the Bhuyan study stated that an effective network anomaly detection 
system must have a “model of normal behavior of the system and … a proximity measure 
that allows one to compute, given an activity record, the degree of deviation that such 
activities have with regard to the model” [22]. As previously stated in this Chapter, in our 
system this proximity measure is a statistical analysis of data with respect to our established 
baselines (our model of “normal” behavior); statistically, anomalies are observations not 
directly related to the model and assumed potentially irrelevant to the model or data being 
investigated [35]. For our work, these anomalous data points provide the basis for detecting 
insider activities or other potentially dangerous activities.  
With our assumption that activities related to insiders are inherently different from 
benign behavior, insider activities must appear as outliers to a “normal” behavior model 
[1], [2], [5], [6], [9]–[11]. Borrowing from Chhabra’s 2008 study, we rank network outliers 
on their deviation within modified “Generalized Quantile Sets (GQS)” of our traffic 
model’s data distribution [32]. These GQSs are multi-leveled areas “where the mass of [a 
distribution or model] is most concentrated,” with the level occupied by a data point 
indicating the level of anomalousness the data point possesses [32]. However, as Chhabra 
describes, one must account for the statistical “multiple testing problem” in that 
“observations in isolation” are not representative of behavior overall and should be 
adjusted to avoid high false-positive rates [32]. To avoid this issue, we create a threat 
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indicator, which is the average of a target’s anomaly indicator value from its GQS level 
and the number of anomalies detected for the target. For this, we use an initial anomaly 
threshold value of GQS level 3 (representing 70% of the distribution) in our system to 
provide some latitude for variation in the target’s activity levels before the system initiates 
a response. Our rationale for this threshold selection is that a host’s activity will not be 
static over time, but if a host’s activity varies more than 30% from their established norm, 
such deviation warrants additional scrutiny and consideration for observation. If a target’s 
average activity is or becomes higher than our initial response threshold, a context anomaly 
conditional alert will occur and the target’s threat indicator value is increased. Additionally, 
if a target’s threat indicator ever exceeds our threat response threshold or its activity ever 
exceeds GQS level 4 (representing 60% of the distribution), a point anomaly conditional 
alert will occur, requiring system response and administrator intervention [22], [32]. 
Regarding host activity anomalies, a similar method as the one described for 
network detection is used. The number of system calls for a given day and time is compared 
with the established norms for the targeted user, and a comparison is made using the event’s 
GQS-based anomaly indicator. Similarly as with network anomalies, if the average of a 
host’s events is higher than our given GQS threshold of 2.5 (representing 75% of the 
distribution), a context anomaly conditional alert will occur; a point anomaly conditional 
alert will trigger if the indicator ever falls below GQS level 3 [22], [32]. We use a lower 
threshold for host activities due to the greater concern regarding significant variations in a 
user’s direct actions; while network activity (specifically volume) may vary in the course 
of normal operations due to network conditions, we consider a user’s normal host activities 
to be more static and thereby more sensitive to variations [36].  
Similarly, the host’s registered user’s established user role and generated 
representative activity groups are used to further detect anomalous behavior. For each of 
these categories, a GQS is generated for the various indicators (volume, time, syscall, etc.), 
against which each event is further checked for anomalousness. If the GQS average of a 
host’s event is higher than our given GQS threshold (GQS level 3 in this case), a context 
anomaly conditional alert will occur; a point anomaly conditional alert will trigger if the 
indicator ever falls below GQS level 4 [22], [32]. Additionally, as indicated previously, 
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our system must immediately respond to any indication of known malicious or dangerous 
activity. Any event matching an established signature of these events will trigger a point 
anomaly conditional alert.  
5. OCO Operational Means to Subvert System Operations 
Although we believe our system methodology can detect anomalous behavior in 
most cases, there exists real potential for developing countermeasures for use in Offensive 
Cyber Operations (OCO). These operations by necessity must seek to minimize exposure 
to reporting and alerting mechanisms, as their presence on a system can have significant 
and far-reaching impacts on military operations and diplomatic ventures; efforts to remain 
within the realm of a target’s “normal” operations are by definition desirable, as they 
provide the greatest concealment [37]. However, an effective insider detection system 
could capture indications of OCO operations, potentially endangering their mission and 
leading to exposure; due to this potential threat of exposure, OCO operators must develop 
means to circumvent such systems. Specifically in our design, if the malicious actor were 
to intercept the features collected or study the system’s data ingest and reporting process, 
there is potential for three primary vectors of circumvention: manipulation, deletion, and 
subversion/stealth.  
In the case of manipulation, if an attacker knew of and could access messages 
between the infrastructure nodes and the central hub, they could intercept the messages 
related to the activities generated from their infected host and change the contents to appear 
less abnormal. By altering the time, volume or activity information, the attacker could 
prevent the system from ingesting data related to the attacker’s malicious activity. While 
difficult to perform wholesale due to the positioning of consolidation nodes and 
requirement for extensive infection in the target system, such a method would provide the 
attacker virtually unimpeded freedom to operate if no other detection system were in place.  
Similarly, given an intermediary position within the reporting network, the attacker 
could simply delete damning messages related to their activity, effectively removing any 
indication of their presence. The current framework of this system does not have a robust 
means of checking for deletions, instead relying on a simple acknowledgment from the 
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central server, which an attacker could subvert relatively simply. Without some form of 
metrics report check—an additional message digest comparison, for example—this 
subversive threat vector would be difficult to correct and rectify without a supplementary 
security system searching for such activities.  
Additionally, if an actor were to study and learn the target network’s “normal” 
message traffic from the resident detection system, the attacker may change his activity to 
remain below the target threshold. For example, if an attacker inspected the proposed 
system’s cleartext update messages from host and network nodes, the attacker could 
discern the metrics being reported and avoid any activities that may appear anomalous or 
any that are specifically targeted by the system. While this method would require time to 
review system information and re-acclimate to the target space, it is the least intrusive of 
the subversion methods against such a system and likely would be the easiest to implement, 
if no other detection system or protections were in place. 
The attacker could potentially use such system knowledge and subversion 
capability as an information warfare weapon, causing significant network congestion, 
detection system inefficiency, or organizational mistrust and dissent. By generating false 
reports or directly altering system configurations, they could cause the detection system to 
react to false positives and significantly skew baseline information across the network. This 
manipulation would severely affect the system’s reliability and functionality, and would 
introduce a great deal of additional resource load on the system beyond its normal operating 
bounds. These false reports could also result in arbitrary false-positive responses by either 
the system or the administration, severely affecting efficiency of the organization’s 
members and potentially leading to mistrust or resentment within the organization. This 
environment of mistrust could result in members leaving the organization due to 
dissatisfaction, provide rationale for members to become insiders in an attempt to respond 
to this perceived mistreatment, or could give adversaries an opportunity to influence and 
recruit the member for malicious purposes.  
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C. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
Our system, referred to as BIFROST, ingests, categorizes, and responds to data 
from network infrastructure nodes and individual hosts to detect and defeat insider threat 
activities. BIFROST provides insider threat detection for organizational networks that do 
not possess this capability, due to prohibitive cost or resource utilization. BIFROST 
develops and maintains user and network baseline data using a composite statistical 
analysis approach with established threat criteria, which reduces required overhead 
resource requirements.  
Figure 1 shows the proposed BIFROST system’s component diagram and the flow 
of information within the architecture, key points of which are identified by the numbered 
sub-elements.  
 
Figure 1. Proposed BIFROST System 
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HEIMDALL is the central reception hub for all reports from other BIFROST nodes, 
serving as the baseline generator for all network entities and the maintenance/update entity 
for the same, to integrate current and historic data and ensure a relevant metric, as seen in 
Figure 1, element 1. HEIMDALL also houses the anomaly detection engine for the system, 
seen in Figure 1, element 2, alerting against established threat response criteria and 
encountered anomalies as determined by its detection engine. This point-and-context 
anomaly analysis provides a full-spectrum representation of network and host activity, 
enabling the system to detect activities that a monolithic analysis method may miss. 
Depending on the severity of the anomaly as determined by deviation from the distribution 
(a deviation correlating to a GQS level of 7, for example, would be much more significant 
than one correlating to GQS level 3), or identification as a known-malicious activity, 
HEIMDALL sends either critical or informational alert to the BIFROST report reception 
node. 
The GJALLARHORN node acts as the administrative interface for the BIFROST 
system, and is the executor of HEIMDALL alerts as seen in Figure 1, elements 3 and 4 
respectively. GJALLARHORN provides the administrator a snapshot of current operations 
within the network, current alerts from HEIMDALL, and historic information about the 
network. From this interface, the administrator can also review a host’s current anomaly 
index, based on deviation from historic data and their system activities. Upon receipt of an 
alert from HEIMDALL, GJALLARHORN displays an alert to the operator for response; 
if the alert is critical, the system independently responds with an isolate response. The 
operator can acknowledge a non-critical report with either an ignore or isolate command. 
The isolate command, received from either an operator or the system, sends a quarantine 
message to the offending host node, as seen in Figure 1, element 5, which results in the 
prevention of any network connections to/from the node and restricts the user to a limited 
set of system operations until an administrator lifts the quarantine.  
Host nodes in BIFROST are known as HOFUND and serve as monitoring platforms 
for activities originating from the target device, seen in Figure 1, element 6. HOFUND logs 
and reports on the actions taken by the user and any utility in use, to include program 
execution, host or networked file system (NFS) interaction, network operations and 
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hardware use; the information reported varies by event type, but minimum information 
collected includes the system call intercepted and the principle arguments for the call. For 
example, a new program execution report might include the system call for execve, the 
target program executable of the call and the arguments for the new program. In addition 
to its role as a reporting node, HOFUND also functions as the executor of 
GJALLARHORN’s quarantine commands. Upon receipt of a quarantine message, 
HOFUND will block the execution of any program not included in a list of acceptable 
utilities and will prevent the host from making network connections, as seen in Figure 1, 
element 7. By doing so, HOFUND will prevent the suspected insider from performing any 
potentially dangerous actions until a review by administrative personnel is completed.  
Finally, nodes residing on organizational network infrastructure are labeled IDRIS. 
These nodes monitor network metrics and relay messages from HOFUND nodes in a given 
network region traversing to the HEIMDALL node as seen in Figure 1, element 8; to 
accomplish its monitor function, IDRIS must reside on the gateway device for each subnet, 
ensuring that it has access to all network activity for accurate metrics. IDRIS uses a simple 
network accounting methodology to maintain network information, reporting information 
about each subnet host’s connections to various target services and endpoints as seen in 
Figure 1, element 9; IDRIS does not perform general packet or payload inspection, as such 
action requires a greater resource allocation, likely exceeding the host device’s capacity. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter described our methodology for generating and maintaining target user 
and network profiles, identifying outlying anomalies, and detecting inherently malicious 
insider actions. We further described the general framework for our monitoring and 
reporting system, BIFROST, to include its intended use and prevention capabilities. We 
analyzed potential subversion shortcomings for such a system, giving insight into 
considerations for system-hardening requirements for DCO and OCO planning purposes. 
Our experiment environment setup and system integration steps were shown, leading to 
our initial results and required optimization steps, which we describe in the following 
chapter.  
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IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND INITIAL RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we present our proof-of-concept system design and implementation, 
and initial testing results. Specifically, we examine our system’s performance on time and 
memory requirements as well as its accuracy on detection of anomalous or malicious 
activities. We provide an overview of success rates of the system against simulated benign 
and anomalous data, as well as an investigation of our system’s theoretical success rates 
using extrapolation of our initial results.  
B. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND SETUP 
To effectively test the BIFROST framework on data from a real-world network, we 
coordinated with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Information Technology and 
Communication Services (ITACS) center to establish a network tap to internal network 
traffic. This tap was a 10Gbps connection created by a virtual network profiler system, 
which passed all traffic that initiated or terminated within the network. Using this data, we 
observed the traffic application and size distributions shown in Figure 2, denoting the 
distribution of Glasgow traffic, which shows the traffic application breakdown of a typical 
weekday for our target network. Of note, ~44% of the observed traffic was encapsulated 
wireless traffic propagating over UDP port 23233 using a Generic Routing Encapsulation 
(GRE) protocol proprietary to Ruckus Wireless as shown in Figure 3. However, using a 
modified version of a dissector utility created by ITACS, we were able to extract these 
packets and account for them within the network model for our experiment [38]. Notably, 
the GRE traffic was primarily encapsulating web traffic (~85%), with the remainder being 
mostly composed of mail, print and SSH activity. Using data collected over a typical 
workday, we created a representation of the network’s normal operational composition, 
segregating data by application and clock hour to find representative distributions usable 
in generating simulations of applications use, as seen in Figure 4.   
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Figure 2. NPS Glasgow Network Traffic 
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Figure 4. NPS Glasgow Weekday Network Traffic Hourly 
Application Graph 
The experimental system environment was contained in a virtual network 
consisting of one CentOS 7 server housing the HEIMDALL and GJALLARHORN nodes, 
three VyOS machines providing routing services and housing the IDRIS nodes, and eight 
Lubuntu desktops and two Ubuntu servers for the HOFUND nodes. These devices were 
initialized with “normal” utilities and services enabled, and with standard security policies 
in place such as Access Control Lists (ACLs) and firewall rules. All basic services being 
hosted within the NPS network (email, domain name services [DNS], secure shell [SSH], 
etc.) were replicated within the test network, with the exclusion of the Ruckus GRE tunnels, 
ITACS secure network management utilities, and DoD-specific network restrictions. 
From the generated network activity model, a random selection method was used 
to select users for simulation in our experiment. In order to ensure the widest representation 
of user activity, only users who were active within at least one standard deviation of the 
mean number of flows and packets within the distribution were selected for simulation. 
With our target users selected, their traffic patterns were simulated using a modified 
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observed by our experiment [39]. To represent normal user host activity, shell scripts were 
written with a variety of user commands, using the TWOS and CERT datasets as a basis 
along with insights from Liu’s 2018 study to align activity patterns examined with 
simulated user schedules [40]–[42]. To represent malicious behavior, additional scripts 
were written to implement known malicious operations, as defined in Chapter III, sections 
B-2 and B-3; additionally, scripts composed of random program executions and network 
connections provided “anomalous” activity injections. Use of these scripts was 
accomplished via random selection, with “normal” scripts set to be selected at a rate 
significantly higher than the “abnormal” activities (~85%); further, the “abnormal” events 
only began after the system baseline had been established.  
The BIFROST network was installed and initialized on each device within the 
network, and the HEIMDALL node began initial baselining operations immediately upon 
initialization. To enable quick adjustment to the system and multiple trials, the 
HEIMDALL node was initialized using a one-day baseline as the initial setting, and an 
initial weight for updates of 85/15 as previously described in Chapter III, Section B-2. This 
setting may have reduced the fidelity of our baseline construction, as described in 
Chapter III, Section B-2, but we believe that the low volume of input data is not severely 
impacted by this change; future trials should examine the efficacy of changing to a longer 
initial baseline period., e.g., two weeks or one month.  
C. INITIAL RESULTS 
Two separate trials of the system were conducted, one composed of mixed 
anomalous and benign events to simulate an active target environment, and a controlled 
trial using only benign “normal” events; in each trial, three separate hosts were targeted. 
During the experiment set trial, Host 1 produced 6,812 benign and 1,845 anomalous events; 
Host 2 produced 7,023 benign and 1703 anomalous events; and Host 3 produced 5,222 
benign and 2,409 anomalous target events. The anomalous events within these datasets 
were mixed between context anomalies (data size, temporal characteristics, irregular file/
application use, etc.) and point anomalies (known bad destinations, dangerous application 
use, etc.). Specifically, Host 1 produced 1,508 context and 212 point anomaly events; 
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Host 2 produced 1322 context and 187 point anomaly events; and Host 3 produced 2128 
context and 179 point anomaly events.  
The system detection results for this trial appeared numerically impressive, 
detecting 1,620 anomalous events for Host 1, 1,599 anomalous events for Host 2 and 422 
anomalous events for Host 3. These detection events break down to 1,445 context anomaly 
and 175 point anomaly events for Host 1; 1,454 context anomaly and 154 point anomaly 
events for Host 2; and 337 context anomaly and 85 point anomaly events for Host 3. At 
first glance, it appears that the system accounted for 87.8%, 93.9% and 17.5% of the 
anomalous events for Hosts 1, 2 and 3, respectively; the rate for Host 3 was significantly 
lower than the other Hosts, and is investigated further in section D-1. Unfortunately, the 
system was not setup to output the exact event that triggers a detection, rendering further 
analysis of this trial problematic. Assuming that all recorded detection events were 
accurate, the detection rates for the three Hosts and the initial trial overall are shown in 
Table 2.
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Table 2. Detection Statistics for BIFROST Using Mixed Anomalous and Benign Data under Accurate Detection 
Assumption 
Data Source P N TP TN FP FN PREC REC FNR FPR ACC F1 
Host 1 1620 7037 1620 6812 0 225 100% 87.8% 12.2% 0% 97.4% 93.5% 
Host 2 1599 7127 1599 7023 0 104 100% 93.9% 6.1% 0% 98.8% 96.8% 
Host 3 422 7209 422 5222 0 1987 100% 17.5% 82.5% 0% 73.9% 29.8% 
Overall 3641 21373 3641 19057 0 2316 100% 61.1% 38.9% 0% 90.7% 75.9% 
P – Number of events alerted on; N – Number of host events not alerted on; TP – Number of true positive alert events; TN – 
Number of true negative alert events; FP – Number of false positive alert events; FN – Number of false negative alert events; 
PREC – Precision, or positive predictive value, of test; REC – Recall, or true positive rate, of test; FNR – False negative rate of 
test; FPR – False positive rate of test; ACC – Accuracy of test (comparison of result and true value); F1 – F-score of test 
35 
During the controlled trial, Host 1 produced 1,993 events, Host 2 produced 1,822 
events, and Host 3 produced 3,967 events. During this trial, the system detected 274 context 
anomaly events for Host 1, 317 context anomaly events for Host 2, and 168 anomaly events 
for Host 3. Considering that there were no intentionally anomalous events, the detection 
rates for this controlled trial are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Detection Statistics for BIFROST Using Known Benign 
Data 
Data Source P N TP TN FP FN FPR ACC 
Host 1 274 1929 0 1929 274 0 12.4% 87.6% 
Host 2 317 1745 0 1745 317 0 15.4% 84.6% 
Host 3 168 3909 0 3909 168 0 4.1% 95.9% 
Overall 759 7583 0 7583 759 0 9.1% 91% 
P – Number of events alerted on; N – Number of host events not alerted on; TP – Number 
of true positive alert events; TN – Number of true negative alert events; FP – Number of 
false positive alert events; FN – Number of false negative alert events; FPR – False positive 
rate of test; ACC – Accuracy of test (comparison of result and true value) 
 
Based on the collected data from both trials, as shown above, we extrapolated a 
false positive rate for the system between 4.1% and 15.4%; however, this is only an 
assumption based on available data and additional testing is required to verify it. Using this 
range as the best-case and worst-case false positive rates, respectively, Table 4 shows the 
potential composite performance of the proof-of-concept system against the experiment 
dataset. 
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Table 4. Theoretical Detection Statistics for BIFROST Using Mixed Anomalous and Benign Data under 
Extrapolated Detection Rate Assumptions 
Data Source P N TP TN FP FN PREC REC FNR FPR ACC F1 
Best-Case 
Scenario 
3641 21373 3492 19057 149 2316 95.9% 60% 40% 4.1% 90.1% 74% 
Worst-Case 
Scenario 
3641 21373 3080 19057 561 2316 84.6% 57.1% 42.9% 15.4% 88.5% 68.2% 
P – Number of events alerted on; N – Number of host events not alerted on; TP – Number of true positive alert events; TN – 
Number of true negative alert events; FP – Number of false positive alert events; FN – Number of false negative alert events; 
PREC – Precision, or positive predictive value, of test; REC – Recall, or true positive rate, of test; FNR – False negative rate of 
test; FPR – False positive rate of test; ACC – Accuracy of test (comparison of result and true value); F1 – F-score of test 
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D. ANALYSIS 
1. System Detection Accuracy 
Notably, there was significant deviation between the results for Hosts 1 and 2 and 
the results for Host 3. Inspecting the raw detection numbers (P) for the first trial, Host 3’s 
baseline appeared to be 73.9% and 73.61% less-effective than those of Hosts 1 and 2 in 
detecting anomalous behavior. Additionally, inspecting the statistical analysis of the trial’s 
results shows that the detection events targeting Host 3 were far less-accurate than that of 
the other two Hosts; specifically, its false negative rate was 576.2% higher than that of 
Host 1 and 1252.5%% higher than that of Host 2. However, the controlled trial showed a 
different view of these results, as Host 3’s inputs triggered less alerts than Hosts 1 and 2 
did against benign inputs, which ultimately caused its false positive rate to be 66.9% lower 
than Host 1 and 73.4% lower than Host 2. These results seem to indicate that the detection 
threshold for Host 3 was more stringent than that of Hosts 1 and 2, reducing the number of 
alerts triggered. Strangely, there were no indicators of bad data within the baseline output 
of Host 3, and its logged activities did not appear to be excessively anomalous compared 
to the baseline; further, no threshold value changes were conducted during any trial. 
Additional testing with a greater number of target hosts is required to determine if this was 
an issue with input from that target or if the deviation is an indication of additional system 
instability or inaccuracy and whether the system’s threshold values are prone to corruption 
and change as the experiment progresses.  
Using only the initial results of the system’s performance against the trial data it is 
not possible to gather an accurate assessment of the system’s accuracy due to the way in 
which BIFROST generates its threat assessment. Specifically, the system does not produce 
an alert or message each time an anomaly is detected due to the threshold requirements for 
threat alerts and the volume of data ingested by the system. To counteract this, the 
controlled trial used only known benign data, which provided an environment to test the 
system and determine what potential false positive rates may be present. Using this 
information, the results in Table 4 were generated to extrapolate potential best and worst-
case detection rates. From this data, the system’s current development state may provide 
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some detection capability against insider threat activities, but it potentially misses 40+% 
of all anomalous events. This, paired with the potential worst-case false positive rate of 
15.4%, results in a system that is currently quite inaccurate and that would provide minimal 
protection against the insider threat. 
However, these proof-of-concept trials were conducted using a small target sample 
size with an artificially low event population. With a greater body of data to perform 
baseline construction and comparison against, there is potential for this system’s accuracy 
rates to increase and provide greater fidelity against insider threat activities. As a proof-of-
concept demonstration, the detection rates (less the disappointing false negative rates) 
observed were fairly impressive and provide a starting point of comparison for further 
development. Specifically, the thresholds used to determine anomalousness were arbitrary 
in nature; significant additional research is required to develop and implement relevant 
threshold and threat score values to increase system capability. Additionally, the future 
inclusion of machine learning should be explored to dynamically adjust the threshold and 
threat score values to account for variations between target organizations. 
2. Baseline Generation Performance 
Our initial system baseline construction design performed reasonably well within 
our test environment, producing a set of initial baseline comparison data for the three target 
hosts in less than 6 seconds using the available simulated inputs; this increased to ~10 
seconds when conducting the baseline update process. As currently implemented, the 
system will ignore context anomalies until the established threshold threat value has been 
met, after which point it identifies any subsequent anomalies with reasonable sensitivity. 
These initial below-threshold anomalies provide significant opportunity for subversion if 
a malicious actor is aware of the “resetting” that occurs during each baseline period.  
3. System Interface 
The current system does not provide for significant administrator interaction, 
limiting the commands available to simple baseline print capabilities, alert test and 
detection threshold manipulations. These limitations will severely degrade the system’s 
ease-of-use, impede analysis by users unfamiliar with the system, and limit the utility it 
39 
provides for operators on live systems. In order to make changes to the system or adjust 
most values, the current implementation requires that the modified subsystem be 
completely halted and restarted after making modifications to the source code. Production 
environments cannot support such requirements, necessitating the introduction of a live 
alteration method with networked change promulgation capability.  
4. Observed System Shortcomings 
We observed some shortfalls in our initial proof-of-concept system that can be 
improved upon in future implementations. For example, our design choice to store target 
network and host data in system memory rather than on the disk resulted in excessive 
memory usage, although it did not cause perceptible system degradation or throttling. Still, 
it is likely that this would result in resource scarcity if the number of monitored hosts or 
the volume of monitored activities increased greatly. Additionally, while our algorithm 
performed well in generating comparison data for anomaly detection, its asymptotic 
complexity resulted in peak CPU utilization of nearly 100%. The algorithm would likely 
produce significant delays in generating data when the input magnitude increases, and 
should be made more efficient. 
Due to the data restrictions in our initial experimentation, we did not intermix 
malicious and benign activities within the initial baseline data, which does not reflect real-
world network traffic or host activity. If the data had been intermixed, there would be the 
real potential for some malicious activities to be overlooked, due to their inclusion in the 
baseline. We believe that the anomalous nature of insider activities would overcome this 
and still provide ample means for detection, however, further study and testing are required 
to confirm these expectations. 
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented initial BIFROST detection system operational results 
utilizing simulated organizational network traffic and host program activity. Our 
experiment design was described to include the methodology used to simulate a target 
organization’s traffic model and the activities of various hosts within the network to 
provide a more realistic test environment for our concept system. Finally, we examined the 
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initial results and identified the system’s detection accuracy and sensitivity using initial 
proof-of-concept design configurations, and identified potential system shortcomings with 
the current design’s limitations. In our next chapter, we discuss the implications of these 
results and provide suggestions for future extension of this work.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this work, we identified shortcomings in existing methods and systems for 
insider threat detection, in both academic and commercial settings. In answer to these 
shortcomings we proposed the BIFROST system, an insider threat detection framework 
that utilized concepts from other established detection frameworks. To test our system 
framework, we developed a simulated organization using network traffic data collected 
from the Naval Postgraduate School and host activity data from the TWOS and CERT 
datasets. Finally, we analyzed and presented our initial results, which showed that the 
current system design has the potential to be developed into a robust detection platform, 
given additional research.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in the previous Chapter, during our trial we observed an F-Score of ~78% 
regarding system accuracy against simulated target activity and a false positive rate of ~4-
15% using a controlled trial. From these initial results, we extrapolated that our proof-of-
concept system implementation resulted in a best-case theoretical true positive rate of 
~60%, a false positive rate of ~4%, a false negative rate of ~40% and an F-Score of ~74%. 
Conversely, its worst-case true positive rate was ~57%, its false positive rate was ~15%, 
its false negative rate was ~43% and its F-Score was ~68%. Using these extrapolated 
detection rates, the system would miss ~40-43% of threat conditions and produce a 
significant number of false alarms. We believe that our initial results were skewed by the 
small sample size used for target data and the manner in which the system performed 
anomaly detection and the arbitrary threshold and threat values used. Comparatively, the 
system proposed by Shaghaghi, et al., had a reported successful detection rate of ~30% in 
its initial result, although their test results were skewed negatively by the large volume of 
events in their trial that were not monitored by their limited initial system implementation. 
Notably, the ELICIT system created by Maloof and Stephens reported an 84% detection 
rate and a false-positive rate of 1.5% against structured scripted simulations and red team 
activities. 
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Also of note, relatively high system utilization was observed within the system 
during both baseline and detection operations with regards to memory and CPU use. This 
did not cause issues with system performance during our experiment due to the limited 
volume of data examined, but could impact real-world results as input magnitude greatly 
increases. Future system implementations must define more meaningful threshold values, 
and improve efficiency of the system’s algorithm for baseline generation and detection 
operations, to handle greater data sample sizes from live targets on a production network.   
We believe that this initial framework has the potential to be developed into a 
system capable of mitigating portions of the insider threat, specifically for organizations 
that cannot field a commercial solution due to prohibitive costs and resource requirements. 
This will require further refinements and system improvements, as described in 
Chapter IV, and additional future capabilities outlined below. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Host Activity Granularity and Malicious Activity Interception 
Our system’s ability to characterize and profile host-level actions is reliant on the 
capability to intercept and inspect the activity of the host’s active user. We chose to 
implement through the use of the Linux System Audit feature, but this method is far from 
ideal. While this does provide for a means to collect many instances of host activity, some 
functions are not necessarily seen by this method and the information provided by default 
through the System Audit logs may not provide as much granularity as needed to monitor 
for insider activities. This method supports the capability to block certain dangerous 
activities through its ACL-like functionality, but it does not prevent the manipulation of its 
configuration file, nor monitor such activity.  
One potential answer to this issue would be to implement a mechanism similar to 
the DRAKVUF system developed by Lengyel et al. [43] or the Syswall tool in development 
by Pugnet [44]. The DRAKVUF system provides a testing environment for malware 
analysis, acting as the intermediary for system activity between a virtualized guest 
operating system and the suspected malware. It intercepts and inspects every system call 
created from the suspect program and conducts analysis of the context, and could 
43 
potentially be used as a basis for developing a system to block execution of calls deemed 
dangerous. Similarly, the Syswall tool provides a firewall-like functionality for Unix 
systems, inserting itself between system calls and the kernel, effectively isolating all 
system calls on the machine until they have been approved by the system’s validation 
mechanism. However, the DRAKVUF method is unfortunately reliant on a virtual 
environment, which is not necessarily a given in many organizations, and the Syswall 
system is still in early development. These are, however, very interesting works with 
regards to identifying new methods of system call observation and control, and could be 
valuable starting points for any future improvements to our system. 
2. Network Observation 
Our proof-of-concept system ingested a limited range of network packet types in 
order to scope the initial work. Any further experimentation must include implementation 
for autonomous collection of non-TCP traffic and non-IPv4 traffic. This will allow for a 
more complete coverage of target activity and provide a more accurate representation of 
system operations. Additionally, further expansion of the system’s monitoring should 
include resolution of traffic destinations to provide more granularity to host and network 
activities.  
3. Administrative Interface 
Our initial system provides limited capability for administrator interaction, 
specifically tied to tailored commands via TCP connections. The final proposed system 
should include a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to provide the administrator the ability to 
view current network statistics and alert information at a glance. To this end, further work 
should develop and implement these administrative tools, and include the ability to adjust 
weights and configurations without necessitating system restart or adjustment to the code 
itself. Additionally, real-time monitoring and display of current host threat scores, similar 
to a scoreboard of the hosts considered the most anomalous or potentially malicious in the 
enterprise, should be available to the administrator, with the option of adjusting the scores 
based on insight or other data. A GUI interface would allow the operator to visually inspect 
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patterns and trends, and provide a means to introduce organizational expertise to the 
process, which may potentially increase system efficacy. 
4. System Efficiency 
The HEIMDAL node took ~6 seconds to configure an initial baseline for three 
target hosts and ~10 seconds to update the baselines for each update period. The time 
required to generate the baseline is a product of the amount of data ingested by our system, 
the algorithmic inefficiency of our baseline generation, and the number of users. 
Considering this with the assumption that resource cost will increase drastically with a 
large host population, we believe that conducting the updates only during off-hours or 
periods of otherwise low network activity would be optimal for system utility. By limiting 
the update period to only ostensibly low activity periods, the amount of data compared 
against a, potentially, outdated baseline will be minimized, increasing system accuracy. 
Efforts to improve this time were not explored in this work, but would likely be readily 
achieved by utilizing a non-interpreted language, more efficient data structures, 
maintaining an on-disk database of baseline information vice maintaining it in memory 
and/or by making algorithmic improvements.  
Additionally, extensive research into thresholds and psychological analysis of 
insider activity on system architecture must be undertaken to define a more accurate 
foundation for appropriate threshold values. Along with this, effort should be made to 
integrate a machine learning component to this system’s threshold management and 
analysis of activity patterns; integrating such a component would provide our system with 
the means to dynamically adapt and specialize itself for the target network’s norms and 
provide a much more accurate tool. 
5. OCO Considerations 
We noted potential methods in Chapter III to manipulate or subvert this system; 
however, defeating such efforts is beyond the scope of this work. An additional detection 
suite should be implemented to conduct in-depth analysis for malicious actor activities 
within the target network. This capability must be supported by a dedicated malware/
malicious logic detection system. More insidiously, if the attacker were to determine the 
45 
message formatting and delivery method for alerts to the HOFUND host-based nodes, the 
attacker could conceivably introduce a great deal of confusion to the network by initiating 
quarantines on various hosts without system intervention, requiring system administrators 
to manually investigate and resolve each incident.  
We believe that protective measures could be developed and integrated into our 
system without significant impact to operational efficiency. Such an example could be the 
implementation of an encrypted challenge/reply between the nodes, or a more robust 
accounting methodology for tracking sent and received messages. Efforts to test 
manipulation and subversion prevention effectiveness should be of highest priority, given 
the significance of the threat to the system and the potential to develop or improve existing 
OCO tradecraft against such systems. 
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SINGLE DAY OPTION 
 
BIFROST HEIMDALL MODULE 30AUG2018 
Scott Findley 
 
Attempts to consolidate insider threat detection and monitoring 
functions within five separate objects: HOFUND the host sensor, IDRIS 
the network sensor, GJALLARHORN the response vector and HEIMDALL the 
anomaly engine/classifying authority 
 
This system conducts analysis of user/network activity and baselines to 
create a "known good" state to conduct anomaly deviation analysis. This 
baseline is updated bi-weekly (daily in the proof-of-concept) with a 
weight of 85/15 against new information unless administrators confirm 
new input as more valid (i.e. user's responsibilities/duties have 
changed permanently). 
 
HEIMDALL functions as the primary agent for the BIFROST system. It 
performs baselining of the target environment, detects anomalies in 
network/host activity, and maintains the current state of the 
enterprise. HEIMDALL conducts analysis of various data points and 
determines the likely threat classification of input characteristics if 
they prove anomalous or otherwise suspicious. With these developed 
classifications and administrator/developer-established thresholds for 
response, HEIMDALL leverages the GJALLARHORN agent for threat response. 
[NOTE: HEIMDALL and GJALLARHORN should reside on the same system, IDRIS 
may reside on the same system if part of small deployments] 
 
30AUG2018 - Scott Findley - Split modules from main code for ease of 
readability.  
30AUG2018 - Scott Findley - Added primitives for connections, crypto 
and basic flow logic 
27NOV2018 - Scott Findley - Added additional planning comments, 
adjusted flow 
04DEC2018 - Scott Findley - Adjusted input parsing 
16DEC2018 - Scott Findley - Finalized initial system flow  
12JAN2019 - Scott Findley - First trial baseline operation 
20JAN2019 - Scott Findley - Identified issue with input data, changed 
storage/utility format 
29JAN2019 - Scott Findley - Adjusted baseline operation  
03FEB2019 - Scott Findley - Adjusted baseline operation, reduced 
comparison types 
12FEB2019 - Scott Findley - Implemented detection system 
21FEB2019 - Scott Findley - Adjusted detection system, implemented 
tiered comparison and threshold 
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13MAR2019 - Scott Findley - Identified issue with baseline, corrupting 
data after 3+ day input 




import socket, threading, sys, os, pickle, time 
#import sqlite3 as SQL 
#import scipy.stats as stats 
import pandas as pd 
import numpy as np 
import sklearn.cluster 
import datetime 
from time import time as get_time 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
#from cryptology.fernet import Fernet 
import json 
 
class HEIMDALL: #classification center 
 
    #receive inputs independent of others 
    #develop baseline for users/network (24 per day, update bi-weekly) 
(one for weekday and one for weekend, maybe?) 
    #each user has own baseline for network and host activity 
    #user groups have own baselines for network and host activity 
    #update baseline for new users/hosts as they appear 
    #update baseline every 15 days, 85/15 weight against new data 
    #provide enterprise updates to GJALLARHORN 
    #perform anomaly processing against new input based on time/host 
involved 
    #administrative events extremely suspicious if not from 
administrative role 
    #anomalous volume/time events extremely suspicious (off-hours, huge 
file reads/writes outside norms)  
    #perform statistical analysis to determine GSQ/cluster deviation 
    #if classified as malicious, create alert to GJALLARHORN and create 
user threat profile entry (logs event type/context, UID, role, threat 
level) 
     
    def __init__(self, 
HEIMDALL_port,GJALLARHORN,storage,update,GJALLARHORN_port,IDRIS_list): 
        self.GJALLARHORN = GJALLARHORN #default address for GJALLARHORN 
is localhost 
        self.GJALLARHORN_port=GJALLARHORN_port 
        self.IDRIS=IDRIS_list 
        self.HEIMDALL_port=HEIMDALL_port 
        self.up_time=get_time() 
        self.up=time.strftime("%DATE:%H:%M:%S", 
time.gmtime(self.up_time)) #time of node start in GMT 
        #should update previous day at start of new day 
        self.interval=86400 #TESTING USE ONLY ### normal interval is 7 
days 604800 
        self.start_interval=86400 #TESTING USE ONLY ### normal interval 
is 14 days 1209600 
        self.first_run=True 
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        self.update_time=get_time()+ self.start_interval #14 day 
initial update timeframe 
        self.connections=[] 
        self.baseline_loc="/home/hub/data/baseline" 
        self.update_loc="/home/hub/data/update_data" 
        self.cluster_loc="/home/hub/data/cluster" 
        self.cluster_update_loc="/home/hub/data/cluster_update_data" 
        self.setup=get_time()-self.up_time #time to setup 
        self.targets=[] 
        self.ready_users=[] 
        self.new_users=[] 
        self.clusters={} 
        
self.days={0:"monday",1:"tuesday",2:"wednesday",3:"thursday",4:"friday"
,5:"saturday",6:"sunday"} 
        self.update_factor=2 #2 day comparison (two weeks) 
        self.cluster_factor=0 
        
self.BLK_LIST={"209.99.40.222":"badguy.com","82.98.86.163":"mod.ru","81
.28.34.108":"wehaku.cn","14.49.30.92":"nukes.ir"} 
        self.MAL_LIST=["seccomp","mmap"] 
        self.ADM_LIST=["ssh","telnet","scp","strace","sysctl"] 
        self.ALERT_stop=False 
        self.up_date=datetime.datetime.now() 
        self.threshold=4500 
        self.d_alerts=[] 
        self.point_alerts=0 
        self.context_alerts=0 
        self.anomaly_alerts=0 
        self.data_size=0 
        self.active=False 
 
    def run(self): 
        os.system("clear") 




        with open("terminal.txt","a+") as file: 
            file.write("HEIMDALL NODE ONLINE AT %d:%d %d-%d-%d\n\n" % 
(self.up_date.hour,self.up_date.minute,self.up_date.day,self.up_date.mo
nth,self.up_date.year)) 
        #start primary loop 
        if self.first_run==True: #check for existing baseline data 
            try: 
                with open(self.baseline_loc,'r') as baseline_file: 
                    x=baseline_file.readline() 
                    if x: 
                        self.first_run=False 
                        self.listen() 
                    else: 
                        self.first_run=False 
                        self.listen() 
            except Exception as e: 
                print(e) 
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                pass 
        elif self.first_run==False: 
            self.listen() 
 
    def listen(self): 
        #receive data from IDRIS, do anomaly detection 
        #set up listener 
        IDRIS=self.IDRIS 
        serverSock=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM) 
        serverSock.bind(("0.0.0.0",self.HEIMDALL_port)) 
        serverSock.listen(50) #50 backlogged connections acceptable 
        #spin off thread for each connection 
        timer=threading.Thread(target=self.timer) 
        timer.start() 
        while True: 
            sock,client=serverSock.accept() 
            if (client[0] not in IDRIS):  
                #do authentication here, if unauthenticated, 
IDRIS[client]=False 
                #IDRIS[client] = True 
                #if IDRIS[client] != True: 
                    #sock.close() 
                sock.close() 
                sock=0 
                print("Unauthorized connection from %s" % client[0]) 
                client=0 
                continue 
            if self.first_run==False: #if not first run, test input 
against baseline 
                
client_t=threading.Thread(target=self.detect,args=(sock,client[0]))#(cl
ient)) 
                self.connections.append(sock) 
                client_t.start() 
            else: #if frist run, just add to update data 
                
updater=threading.Thread(target=self.update,args=(sock,self.update_df,s
elf.cluster_update_df)) 
                self.connections.append(sock) 
                updater.start() 
 
    def timer(self): 
        newday=False 
        while True: 
            check=self.update_time-get_time() 
            if (check<=0): 
                if datetime.datetime.now().hour != 15: ###TESTING ONLY, 
NORMAL VALUE IS 23 
                    pass 
                else: 
                    self.update_time=get_time()+self.interval 
                    baseliner=threading.Thread(target=self.baseline) 
                    baseliner.start() 
            now=datetime.datetime.now() 
            if (newday==True) and (now.strftime('%H:%M')=="00:00"): 
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                newday==False 
            if (now.strftime('%H:%M')=="01:00"): 
                newday=True 
 
    def update(self, client, data=[], addr=0, role=0): 
        #data = 
[[usr_addr,usr_role],{(sport,dport,dest):[pkt,size],},{call:[cnt,params
],}] 
        if client ==0: #data available from detect 
            foun=0 
            for x in self.ready_users: 
                if x.addr==addr: 
                    user=x 
                    foun=1 
                    break 
            for x in self.new_users: 
                if x.addr==addr: 
                    user=x 
                    foun=1 
                    break 
            if foun != 1: 
                user=USER(addr,role) 
                self.new_users.append(user) 
            hour=datetime.datetime.now().hour 
            day=datetime.datetime.today().weekday() #0-6 Monday-Sunday 
            user.u_update(data,hour,day) 
        else: 
            try: 
                data=client.recv(2048) #report=[target,(host OR net), 
((call: count, parameters) | (flow: cnt, size))] 
                report=pickle.loads(data) 
                target=report[0] 
                client.close() 
                if report[1] == "host": 
                    ca=report[2] 
                    for x in ca.keys(): 
                        call=x 
                        dat=ca[x] 
                        cnt=dat[0] 
                        param=dat[1] 
                    data=[0,0,0,call,cnt,param] 
                elif report[1] == "net": 
                    f=report[2] 
                    for x in f.keys(): 
                        flow=x 
                        dat=f[x] 
                        cnt=dat[0] 
                        size=dat[1] 
                    data=[flow,cnt,size,0,0,0] 
                elif target[1]=='print': 
                    client.close() 
                    return 
                elif target[1]=='active': 
                    self.active=True 
                    self.first_run=False 
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                    client.close() 
                    dt=datetime.datetime.now() 
                    print("\nDETECT MODE ENABLED FROM UPD AT %d:%d on 
%d-%d-%d\n" % (dt.hour,dt.minute,dt.day,dt.month,dt.year)) 
                    return 
                client.close() 
                print(target) 
                self.connections.remove(client) 
                foun=0 
                for x in self.ready_users: 
                    if x.addr==target[0]: 
                        user=x 
                        foun=1 
                        break 
                for x in self.new_users: 
                    if x.addr==addr: 
                        user=x 
                        foun=1 
                        break 
                if foun != 1: 
                    user=USER(target[0],target[1]) 
                    self.new_users.append(user) 
                hour=datetime.datetime.now.hour() 
                day=datetime.datetime.today.weekday() #0-6 Monday-
Sunday 
                user.u_update(data,hour,day) 
            except Exception as e: 
                print("Error receiving update from IDRIS node") 
                print(e) 
                return 
 
    def baseline(self): 
        #get mean, sd, variance for network on each hour 
        #find distribution of data 
        #find GSQs (LVL 1-5) 
        #find k-means++ clusters 
        running=[] 
        start=get_time() 
        x=datetime.datetime.now() 
        hourz=x.hour 
        dayz=x.weekday() 
        day=self.days[x.weekday()] 
        fd=open("terminal.txt","a+") 
        print("System baseline operation started at %d:%d on %s %d-%d-
%d" % (x.hour,x.minute,day,x.day,x.month,x.year)) 
        fd.write("Baseline started at %d:%d %d-%d-%d\n" % 
(x.hour,x.minute,x.day,x.month,x.year)) 
        x=0 
        users=[] 
        try: 
            for user in self.ready_users: 
                x=user.addr 
                users.append(x) 
                baser=threading.Thread(target=user.base, 
args=(hourz,dayz)) 
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                running.append(baser) 
                baser.start() 
            for user in self.new_users: 
                x=user.addr 
                users.append(x) 
                baser=threading.Thread(target=user.base, 
args=(hourz,dayz)) 
                running.append(baser) 
                baser.start() 
        except Exception as e: 
            print("Issue with baseline ",e) 
        for runner in running: 
            runner.join() 
        for user in self.new_users: 
            self.ready_users.append(user) 
            self.new_users.remove(user) 
        x=datetime.datetime.now() 
        for user in self.ready_users: 
            self.data_size+=user.size 
            user.size=0 
        if len(self.ready_users)==0: 
            total_size=0 
        else: 
            total_size=self.data_size/len(self.ready_users) 
        print("%d bytes in use for baseline data (~%.2f bytes/host)" % 
(self.data_size,total_size)) 
        fd.write("%d bytes for baseline (~%.2f B/host)\n" % 
(self.data_size,total_size)) 
        self.data_size=0 
        total=get_time()-start 
        if len(self.ready_users)==0: 
            total_per_host=0 
        else: 
            total_per_host=total/len(self.ready_users) 
        print("System baseline for operation complete: %f seconds taken 
for %d hosts (~%f seconds/host), finished at %d:%d on %s %d-%d-%d\n" % 
(total,len(self.ready_users),total_per_host,x.hour,x.minute,day,x.day,x
.month,x.year)) 
        fd.write("Baseline complete: %f seconds for %d hosts (~%f sec/
host)\n\n" % (total,len(self.ready_users),total_per_host)) 
        fd.close() 
        login_low=[] 
        login_high=[] 
        logout_low=[] 
        logout_high=[] 
        flow_pkt_low=[] 
        flow_pkt_high=[] 
        flow_size_low=[] 
        flow_size_high=[] 
        call_low=[] 
        call_high=[] 
        for user in self.ready_users: 
            for entry in user.cluster_flow: 
                flow_pkt_low.append(entry["cnt"][0]) 
                flow_pkt_high.append(entry["cnt"][1]) 
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                flow_size_low.append(entry["size"][0]) 
                flow_size_high.append(entry["size"][1]) 
            for entry in user.cluster_call: 
                call_low.append(entry[0]) 
                call_high.append(entry[1]) 
        ########### 
        ########### 
        #self.cluster() 
         
    """def cluster(self) 
        #assign clusters to users 
        #do cluster stuff""" 
 
    def detect(self,client,node): 
        #data = 
[[usr_addr,usr_role],type,({(sport,dport,dest):[pkt,size],},{call:[cnt,
params],})] 
        data=[] 
        BLK_LIST=self.BLK_LIST 
        ADM_LIST=self.ADM_LIST 
        MAL_LIST=self.MAL_LIST 
        now=datetime.datetime.now() 
        days=self.days 
        day=(datetime.datetime.today().weekday()) 
        hour=datetime.datetime.today().hour 
        try: 
            data=client.recv(2048) #report=[[addr,role],type,{data}] 
#flows={(sport,dport,dest,time):[pkt,size]} 
#calls={call:[cnt,[params]]} 
            report=pickle.loads(data) 
            target=report[0] 
            addr=target[0] 
            role=target[1] 
            client.close() 
            if report[1] == "host": 
                ca=report[2] 
                for x in ca.keys(): 
                    call=x 
                    dat=ca[x] 
                    cnt=dat[0] 
                    param=dat[1] 
                data=[0,0,0,call,cnt,param] 
                check_flow=0 
                check_pkt=0 
                check_size=0 
                check_call=call 
                check_call_cnt=cnt 
                check_call_param=param 
            elif report[1] == "net": 
                f=report[2] 
                for x in f.keys(): 
                    flow=x 
                    dat=f[x] 
                    cnt=dat[0] 
                    size=dat[1] 
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                data=[flow,cnt,size,0,0,0] 
                check_flow=flow 
                check_pkt=cnt 
                check_size=size 
                check_call=0 
                check_call_cnt=0 
                check_call_param=0 
            elif role=="alert test": 
                addr=target 
                print("\n*******************************") 
                print("SENDING TEST ALERT TO GJALLARHORN") 
                print("*******************************") 
                
test_alert=threading.Thread(target=self.alert,args=(addr[0],"DANGER",da
tetime.datetime.now())) 
                test_alert.start() 
                return 
            elif role=="anomaly reset": 
                for user in self.ready_users: 
                    user.anomalies=0 
                    user.threat_score=0 
                    self.point_alerts=0 
                    self.context_alerts=0 
                    self.anomaly_alerts=0 
                return 
            elif role=="lift test": 
                addr=target 
                print("\n*******************************") 
                print("SENDING TEST LIFT TO GJALLARHORN") 
                print("*******************************") 
                
test_lift=threading.Thread(target=self.alert,args=(addr[0],"LIFT",datet
ime.datetime.now())) 
                test_lift.start() 
                return 
            elif role=="thresh": 
                thresh=report[1] 
                dt=datetime.datetime.now() 
                print("\nCHANGED THRESHOLD VALUES FROM %d TO %d AT 
%d:%d %d-%d-%d\n" % (dt.hour,dt.minute,dt.day,dt.month,dt.year)) 
                self.threshold=thresh 
                return 
            elif target[1]=='active': 
                self.active=True 
                dt=datetime.datetime.now() 
                print("\nENTERED DETECTION MODE FROM SEC AT %d:%d %d-
%d-%d\n" % (dt.hour,dt.minute,dt.day,dt.month,dt.year)) 
                return 
            elif role=="print": 
                with open(self.baseline_loc,'a+') as wr: 
                    
print("\n**********************************************") 
                    print("PRINTING CURRENT TARGET DATA to %s" % 
self.baseline_loc) 
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print("**********************************************") 
                    print("POINT ALERTS : %d" % self.point_alerts) 
                    print("CONTEXT ALERTS: %d" % self.context_alerts) 
                    print("ANOMALY ALERTS: %d" % self.anomaly_alerts) 
                    danger_data=self.d_alerts 
                    buffer="***************\n***************\n" 
                    wr.write("***********\nDANGER-LEVEL ALERTS:\n") 
                    for x in danger_data: 
                        wr.write(x) 
                        wr.write("\n") 
                    for user in self.ready_users: 
                        with open("trial","a+") as fi: 
                            print(user.addr,file=fi) 
                            print("Threat: %d" % user.threat_score, 
file=fi) 
                            print("Anomalies: %d" % 
user.anomalies,file=fi) 
                            print("Danger alerts: ",file=fi) 
                            print(user.danger_alert,file=fi) 
                            print("\n", file=fi) 
                        title=("HOST: %s\n" % user.addr) 
                        wr.write(buffer) 
                        wr.write(title) 
                        wr.write("\n") 
                        wr.write("Threat score: %d\n" % 
user.threat_score) 
                        wr.write("Danger alerts:\n") 
                        d_data=user.danger_alert 
                        for data in d_data: 
                            wr.write(json.dumps(data)) 
                        wr.write("\n") 
                        wr.write(buffer) 
                print("\n*********") 
                print("Data written to baseline file") 
                print("*********") 
                return 
            else: #bad input 
                print("\nBad input from IDRIS node %s:" % node) 
                print(report) 
                return 
            client_t=threading.Thread(target=self.update, 
args=(0,data,addr,role)) 
            client_t.start() 
            self.connections.remove(client) 
            found=0 
            for x in self.ready_users: 
                if x.addr==target[0]: 
                    user=x 
                    found=1 
                    break 
            if found == 0: 
                return #no user data available, no need to check 
further 
            if self.active==False: 
57 
                return 
        except Exception as e: 
            print("\nError receiving update from IDRIS node") 
            print(e) 
            return 
        role=target[1] 
        #user_cluster=user.baseline_cluster 
        d_input=datetime.datetime.now() 
        date_input_call=("%d-%d-%d | %d:%d | %s" % 
(d_input.day,d_input.month,d_input.year,d_input.hour,d_input.minute,che
ck_call)) 
        date_input_flow=("%d-%d-%d | %d:%d | %s" % 
(d_input.day,d_input.month,d_input.year,d_input.hour,d_input.minute,che
ck_flow)) 
        d_alert_input=("%d-%d-%d | %d:%d | %s" % 
(d_input.day,d_input.month,d_input.year,d_input.hour,d_input.minute,use
r.addr)) 
        if check_call!=0: 
            if (check_call in MAL_LIST): #known bad 
                #instant alert 
                print("\nALERT GENERATED FOR USER %s: Known dangerous 
activity %s found" % (target[0],check_call)) 
                user.threat_score+=15 
                if date_input_call not in user.danger_alert: 
                    user.danger_alert.append(date_input_call) 
                    self.d_alerts.append(d_alert_input) 
                    
send_alert=threading.Thread(target=self.alert,args=(user.addr,"DANGER",
datetime.datetime.now())) 
                    send_alert.start() 
                    self.point_alerts+=1 
                    return 
            if ((check_call_param in ADM_LIST) or (check_call in 
ADM_LIST)) and (role != "admin"): #admin tool without admin 
                #instant alert 
                print("\nALERT GENERATED FOR USER %s: Non-admin user 
launched admin tool %s" % (target[0],check_call)) 
                user.threat_score+=15 
                if date_input_call not in user.danger_alert: 
                    user.danger_alert.append(date_input_call) 
                    self.d_alerts.append(d_alert_input) 
                    
send_alert=threading.Thread(target=self.alert,args=(user.addr,"DANGER",
datetime.datetime.now())) 
                    send_alert.start() 
                    self.point_alerts+=1 
                    return 
        if check_flow!=0: 
            if (check_flow[2] in BLK_LIST): 
                #instant alert 
                print("\nALERT GENERATED FOR USER %s: Unauthorized 
traffic to %s" % (target[0],BLK_LIST[check_flow[2]])) 
                user.threat_score+=15 
                if date_input_flow not in user.danger_alert: 
                    user.danger_alert.append(date_input_flow) 
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                    self.d_alerts.append(d_alert_input) 
                    
send_alert=threading.Thread(target=self.alert,args=(user.addr,"DANGER",
datetime.datetime.now())) 
                    send_alert.start() 
                    self.point_alerts+=1 
                    return 
        maliciousness=user.threat_score #get previous value 
        compare=user.quantiles[hour] 
        flow_gqs_lvl2=compare[1][0] 
        flow_gqs_lvl3=compare[1][1] 
        flow_gqs_lvl4=compare[1][2] 
        call_gqs_lvl2=compare[2][0] 
        call_gqs_lvl3=compare[2][1] 
        call_gqs_lvl4=compare[2][2] 
        checker=user.baseline[hour] 
        login_base=checker[0] 
        flow_base=checker[1] 
        call_base=checker[2] 
        #print("\n") 
        #print(user.addr) 
        #print(compare) 
        #print("\n") 
        anomalies=0 
        if check_flow==0: 
            pass 
        else: 
            match=0 
            flow_2=0 
            flow_3=0 
            flow_4=0 
            flow_check_1=0 
            try: 
                if ((flow_base==0) or (flow_base==[])): #no data for 
this type 
                    #print("NO FLOW BASELINE FOR THIS HOUR: %s" % 
user.addr) 
                    anomalies+=1 
                    maliciousness+=5 
            except: 
                for row in flow_base['flow dest']: 
                    if check_flow[2]==row: 
                        match=1 
                if match==0: 
                    anomalies+=1 
                    flow_check_1=1 
                    maliciousness+=1 
                ######## 
                #must add ability to account for low flow counts at 
start of the hour 
                ######## 
                try: 
                    if flow_gqs_lvl2[0]==0: 
                        anomalies+=1 
                        maliciousness+=3 
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                except: 
                    if ((check_pkt >= flow_gqs_lvl2['cnt'][0]) and 
(check_pkt <= flow_gqs_lvl2['cnt'][1])): 
                    #within 80% of density, potential concern 
                        if ((check_pkt >= flow_gqs_lvl3['cnt'][0]) and 
(check_pkt <= flow_gqs_lvl3['cnt'][1])): 
                            #within 70% of density, potential concern 
                            if ((check_pkt >= flow_gqs_lvl4['cnt'][0]) 
and (check_pkt <= flow_gqs_lvl4['cnt'][1])): 
                                #within 60% of density, no great 
concern 
                                pass 
                            else: 
                                #between 70% and 60% density, concern 
                                #maliciousness+=2 
                                #pass 
                                flow_4=1 
                        else: 
                            #between 80% and 70% density, concern 
                            #anomalies+=1 
                            #flow_got=1 
                            #maliciousness+=1 
                            flow_3=1 
                    else: #concerning 
                        #print("ALERT GENERATED FOR USER %s: User 
packet count outside extreme normal range for %s:%d " % 
(target[0],days[day],hour)) 
                        #maliciousness+=5 
                        #anomalies+=1 
                        flow_2=1 
                while True: 
                    if flow_2==0: 
                        #within gqs_2 
                        if flow_3==0: 
                            #within gqs_3 
                            if flow_4==0: 
                                #within gqs_4 
                                break 
                            else: 
                                #outside gqs_4, within gqs_3 
                                maliciousness+=1 
                                break 
                        else: 
                            #outside gqs_3, within gqs_2 
                            maliciousness+=2 
                            break 
                    else: 
                        #outside gqs_2 
                        maliciousness+=5 
                        if flow_check_1==0: 
                            anomalies+=1 
                            flow_check_1=1 
                            break 
                        else: 
                            break 
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            ######## 
            #must add ability to account for low flow counts at start 
of the hour 
            ######## 
                flow_4=0 
                flow_3=0 
                flow_2=0 
                if ((check_size >= flow_gqs_lvl2['size'][0]) and 
(check_size <= flow_gqs_lvl2['size'][1])): 
                #within 80% of density, potential concern 
                    if ((check_size >= flow_gqs_lvl3['size'][0]) and 
(check_size <= flow_gqs_lvl3['size'][1])): 
                        #within 70% of density, potential concern 
                        if ((check_size >= flow_gqs_lvl4['size'][0]) 
and (check_size <= flow_gqs_lvl4['size'][1])): 
                            #within 60% of density, no great concern 
                            pass 
                        else: 
                            #between 70% and 60% density, concern 
                            #maliciousness+=2 
                            flow_4=1 
                    else: 
                        flow_3=1 
                else: #concerning 
                    flow_2=1 
                while True: 
                    if flow_2==0: 
                        if flow_3==0: 
                            if flow_4==0: 
                                break 
                            else: 
                                maliciousness+=1 
                                break 
                        else: 
                            maliciousness+=2 
                            break 
                    else: 
                        maliciousness+=5 
                        if flow_check_1==1: 
                            break 
                        else: 
                            anomalies+=1 
                            break 
        if check_call==0: 
            pass 
        else: 
            match=0 
            call_check_1=0 
            try: 
                if ((call_base==0) or (call_base==[])): 
                    #print("NO CALL BASELINE DATA FOR THIS HOUR: %s" % 
user.addr) 
                    maliciousness+=5 
                    anomalies+=1 
            except: 
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                call_4=0 
                call_3=0 
                call_2=0 
                for row in call_base['syscall']: 
                    if check_call==row: 
                        match=1 
                if match==0: 
                    anomalies+=1 
                    maliciousness+=3 
                    call_check_1=1 
            ######## 
            #must add ability to account for low flow counts at start 
of the hour 
            ######## 
                if ((check_call_cnt >= call_gqs_lvl2[0]) and 
(check_call_cnt <= call_gqs_lvl2[1])): 
                    #within 80% density 
                    if ((check_call_cnt >= call_gqs_lvl3[0]) and 
(check_call_cnt <= call_gqs_lvl3[1])): 
                        #within 70% density 
                        if ((check_call_cnt >= call_gqs_lvl4[0]) and 
(check_call_cnt <= call_gqs_lvl4[1])): 
                            #within 60% density 
                            pass 
                        else: 
                            #between 70% and 60% density, concern 
                            call_4=1 
                    else: 
                        call_3=1 
                else: #concerning 
                    call_2=1 
                while True: 
                    if call_2==0: 
                        if call_3==0: 
                            if call_4==0: 
                                break 
                            else: 
                                maliciousness+=1 
                                break 
                        else: 
                            maliciousness+=2 
                            break 
                    else: 
                        maliciousness+=5 
                        if call_check_1==0: 
                            anomalies+=1 
                            break 
                        else: 
                            break 
                
check_list=call_base.index[call_base['syscall']==check_call].tolist() 
                match=0 
                matcher=0 
                existing_calls=[] 
                for x in check_list: 
62 
                    try: 
                        da=call_base.iloc[x] 
                        existing_calls=da[2] 
                        for test in check_call_param: 
                            for answer in existing_calls: 
                                if test==answer: 
                                    match+=1 
                    except: 
                        #shenanigans 
                        pass 
                    matcher=len(existing_calls) 
                if match!=matcher: 
                    if call_check_1==0: 
                        anomalies+=1 
                        maliciousness+=3 
                    else: 
                        maliciousness+=3 
        ################### 
        #do cluster comparison 
        ################### 
        user.threat_score+=maliciousness 
        user.anomalies+=anomalies 
        d_input=datetime.datetime.now() 
        date_input=(("%d-%d-%d | %d:%d | Anomaly") % 
(d_input.day,d_input.month,d_input.year,d_input.hour,d_input.minute)) 
        d_alert_input=(("%d-%d-%d | %d:%d | %s") % 
(d_input.day,d_input.month,d_input.year,d_input.hour,d_input.minute,use
r.addr)) 
        if ((maliciousness >= self.threshold) and (maliciousness < 
self.threshold*1.5)): 
            
#print("************************************************************") 
            #print("CAUTION alert generated for: user - %s | threat 
value - %d" % (user.addr,maliciousness)) 
            
#print("************************************************************") 
            
send_alert=threading.Thread(target=self.alert,args=(user.addr,"CAUTION"
,datetime.datetime.now())) 
            send_alert.start() 
            self.anomaly_alerts+=1 
        elif maliciousness >= self.threshold*1.5: 
            
#print("************************************************************") 
            #print("DANGER alert generated for: user - %s | threat 
value - %d" % (user.addr,maliciousness)) 
            
#print("************************************************************") 
            if date_input not in user.danger_alert: 
                user.danger_alert.append(date_input) 
                self.d_alerts.append(d_alert_input) 
            
send_alert=threading.Thread(target=self.alert,args=(user.addr,"DANGER",
datetime.datetime.now())) 
            send_alert.start() 
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            self.context_alerts+=1 
 
    def alert(self, HOFUND, category, timestomp): 
        #send formatted alert to GJALLARHORN 
        #wait for acknowledgement: if not received in 45s, retransmit 
        sock=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM) 
        try: 
            sock.connect((self.GJALLARHORN,self.GJALLARHORN_port)) 
        except Exception as e: 
            #print(e) 
            print("\nConnection issue sending alert to GJALLARHORN: 
Server may not be listening at %s:%d" % 
(self.GJALLARHORN,self.GJALLARHORN_port)) 
        alert_stop=False 
        while alert_stop != True: 
            try: 
                msg=[HOFUND,category,timestomp] 
                msg=pickle.dumps(msg) 
                sock.send(msg) 
                alert_stop=self.alert_recv(sock) 
                if alert_stop!=True: 
                    time.sleep(15) 
            except (ConnectionResetError): 
                print("\nConnection issue sending alert to GJALLARHORN 
against host %s: Server not accepting at port %d" % 
(self.GJALLARHORN,HOFUND,self.GJALLARHORN_port)) 
                return 
            except Exception as e: 
                print("\nUnknown Exception connecting to GJALLARHORN 
against host %s: " % HOFUND) 
                print(e) 
                return 
        return 
 
    def alert_recv(self,sock): 
        try: 
            result=sock.recv(1024).decode() 
        except Exception as e: 
            print("\nError receiving from GJALLARHORN: " + e) 
            stop=False 
            return stop 
        if "STOP" in result: #GJALLARHORN received message 
            stop=True 
            sock.close() 
            return stop 
 
class USER: 
    #data = 
[[usr_addr,usr_role],{(sport,dport,dest):[pkt,size],},{call:[cnt,params
],}] 
    def __init__(self,addr,role): 
        self.addr=addr 
        self.role=role 
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        self.data={} 
#{date:{hour:[{login:[time,],logout:[time,]},{flow:[cnt, 
size],},{call:[cnt,[param]],}],}} 








        self.cluster={} 
        self.threat_score=0 
        self.cluster_flow=[] 
        self.cluster_call=[] 
        self.cluster_log=[] 
        self.danger_alert=[] 
        self.size=0 
        self.anomalies=0 
 
    def u_update(self,record,hour,day): 
        #record =[flow,cnt,size,call,cnt,param] 
        flow=record[0] #flow 
        call=record[3] #call 
        dow=self.data 
        dat=datetime.date.today() 
        date=("%d-%d-%d" % (dat.day,dat.month,dat.year)) 
        try: 
            if dow[date]: 
                pass 
            if dow[date][hour]: 
                pass 
        except KeyError as e: 
            try: 
                if dow[date]: 
                    pass 
            except: 
                dow[date]={} 
            try: 
                if dow[date][hour]: 
                    pass 
            except: 
                dow[date][hour]=[{},{},{}] 
                dow[date][hour][0]['login']=[] 
                dow[date][hour][0]['logout']=[] 
        if call=="login": 
            try: 
                dow[date][hour][0]['login'].append(record[5]) 
            except: #key error 
                dow[date][hour][0]['login'].append(record[5]) 
        if call=='logout': 
            try: 
                dow[date][hour][0]['logout'].append(record[5]) 
            except: #key error 
                dow[date][hour][0]['logout'].append(record[5]) 
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        if flow!=0: 
            try: 
                dow[date][hour][1][flow][0]=record[1] 
                dow[date][hour][1][flow][1]=record[2] 
            except: 
                dow[date][hour][1][flow]=[record[1],record[2]] 
        if call!=0: 
            try: 
                dow[date][hour][2][call][0]=record[4] 
                dow[date][hour][2][call][1]=record[5] 
            except Exception as e: 
                dow[date][hour][2][call]=[record[4],record[5]] 
 
    def base(self,hourz,dayz): 
        #return a dataframe for each day (check against quantile for 
detection) 
        #consider adding logic to support daily update vice weekly 
(only current day vice for dow in self.days) 
        labels=['hour','login','logout','flow dest','flow count','flow 
size','syscall','call count','call params'] 
        log_labels=['login','logout'] 
        flow_labels=['flow dest','flow count','flow size'] 
        call_labels=['syscall','call count','call parameters'] 












        day=self.data 
        for date in day: 
            fd=open("Log-%s.txt" % self.addr,'a+') 
            fd.write("%s data found\n" % date) 












            for hour in self.data[date]: #0-23 
                hour_log=[] 
                hour_flows=[] 
                hour_calls=[] 
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hour_log.append((self.data[date][hour][0]['login'],self.data[date][hour
][0]['logout'])) 
                for flow in self.data[date][hour][1]: 
                    
hour_flows.append((flow[2],self.data[date][hour][1][flow][0],self.data[
date][hour][1][flow][1])) # dest, cnt, size 
                for call in self.data[date][hour][2]: 
                    
hour_calls.append((call,self.data[date][hour][2][call][0],self.data[dat
e][hour][2][call][1])) #call, cnt, param 
                
log_df=pd.DataFrame.from_records(hour_log,columns=log_labels) 
                
flow_df=pd.DataFrame.from_records(hour_flows,columns=flow_labels) 
                
call_df=pd.DataFrame.from_records(hour_calls,columns=call_labels) 
                if ((hour_log[0][0]!=[]) and (hour_log[0][1]!=[])):  
                    lq1=log_df.quantile(0.15) 
                    lq2=log_df.quantile(0.85) 
                    liqr=lq2-lq1 
                    log_df_no_out=log_df[~((log_df < (lq1 - 1.5*liqr)) 
| (log_df > (lq2 + 1.5*liqr))).any(axis=1)] 
                    date_log[hour]=log_df_no_out 
                else: 
                    date_log[hour]=0 
                if (flow_df.empty): 
                    date_flows[hour]=flow_df #####THIS WAS =0 
                else: 
                    hq1=flow_df.quantile(0.15) 
                    hq2=flow_df.quantile(0.85) 
                    hiqr=hq2-hq1 
                    flow_df_no_out=flow_df[~((flow_df[['flow 
count','flow size']] < (hq1 - 1.5*hiqr)) | (flow_df[['flow count', 
'flow size']] > (hq2 + 1.5*hiqr))).any(axis=1)] 
                    date_flows[hour]=flow_df_no_out 
                if (call_df.empty): 
                    date_calls[hour]=call_df #########THIS WAS =0 
                else: 
                    cq1=call_df.quantile(0.15) 
                    cq2=call_df.quantile(0.85) 
                    ciqr=cq2-cq1 
                    call_df_no_out=call_df[~((call_df[['call count']] < 
(cq1 - 1.5*ciqr)) | (call_df[['call count']] > (cq2 + 
1.5*ciqr))).any(axis=1)] 
                    date_calls[hour]=call_df_no_out 
                ######################### 
                #CHANGED THIS############ #WAS OUTSIDE THE LINE 843 IF 
                ######################### 
                try: 
                    if day_log[hour]==[]: 
                        day_log[hour]=date_log[hour] 
                    else: 
                        log_df1=day_log[hour] 
                        log_df2=date_log[hour] 
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                        try: 
                            log_df3=pd.concat([log_df1,log_df2]) 
                            day_log[hour]=log_df3 
                        except: 
                            pass 
                except: 
                    day_log[hour]=date_log[hour] 
                try: 
                    if day_flows[hour]==[]: 
                        day_flows[hour]=date_flows[hour] 
                    else: 
                        flow_df1=day_flows[hour] 
                        flow_df2=date_flows[hour] 
                        try: 
                            flow_df3=pd.concat([flow_df1,flow_df2]) 
                            day_flows[hour]=flow_df3 
                        except Exception as e: 
                            print("broke data update ",e) 
                except: 
                    day_flows[hour]=date_flows[hour] 
                try: 
                    if day_calls[hour]==[]: 
                        day_calls[hour]=date_calls[hour] 
                    else: 
                        call_df1=day_calls[hour] 
                        call_df2=date_calls[hour] 
                        try: 
                            call_df3=pd.concat([call_df1,call_df2]) 
                            day_calls[hour]=call_df3 
                        except Exceptiona as e: 
                            print("broke data update",e) 
                except: 
                    day_calls[hour]=date_calls[hour] 
                ########################## 
                #TO HERE################## 
                ########################## 
            with open("%s-%s" % (self.addr,date),"a+") as op: 
                print(date,file=op) 
                print(day_flows,file=op) 
                print("\n",file=op) 
                print(day_calls,file=op) 
                print("\n",file=op) 
        for hour in self.baseline: 
            y=self.baseline[hour] 
            if y == []: #[[],[],[]]: #no existing data 
                
self.baseline[hour]=[day_log[hour],day_flows[hour],day_calls[hour]] 
                compare=self.baseline[hour] 
                login_base=compare[0] 
                flow_base=compare[1] 
                call_base=compare[2] 
                try: #login 
                    x=login_base['login'] 
                    lniqr2=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.8)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
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                    loiqr2=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.8)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.2))*1.5 





                    lniqr3=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.7)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
                    loiqr3=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.7)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.3))*1.5 





                    lniqr4=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.6)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                    loiqr4=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.6)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.4))*1.5 





                    if login_gqs_lvl2['login'][0]<=0: 
                        login_gqs_lvl2['login'][0]=0 
                    if login_gqs_lvl2['logout'][0]<=0: 
                        login_gqs_lvl2['logout'][0]=0 
                    if login_gqs_lvl3['login'][0]<=0: 
                        login_gqs_lvl3['login'][0]=0 
                    if login_gqs_lvl3['logout'][0]<=0: 
                        login_gqs_lvl3['logout'][0]=0 
                    if login_gqs_lvl4['login'][0]<=0: 
                        login_gqs_lvl4['login'][0]=0 
                    if login_gqs_lvl4['logout'][0]<=0: 
                        login_gqs_lvl4['logout'][0]=0 
                    self.cluster_log.append(login_gqs_lvl4) 
                except: 
                    login_gqs_lvl2={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                    login_gqs_lvl3={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                    login_gqs_lvl4={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                try: #flow 
                    x=flow_base['flow count'] #dies here if no values 
                    cntiqr2=(flow_base['flow count'].quantile(0.8)-
flow_base['flow count'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                    sizeiqr2=(flow_base['flow size'].quantile(0.8)-
flow_base['flow size'].quantile(.2))*1.5 





                    cntiqr3=(flow_base['flow count'].quantile(0.7)-
flow_base['flow count'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
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                    sizeiqr3=(flow_base['flow size'].quantile(0.7)-
flow_base['flow size'].quantile(.3))*1.5 





                    cntiqr4=(flow_base['flow count'].quantile(0.6)-
flow_base['flow count'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                    sizeiqr4=(flow_base['flow size'].quantile(0.6)-
flow_base['flow size'].quantile(.4))*1.5 





                    try: 
                        if np.isnan(flow_gqs_lvl4['size'][0]): 
                            flow_gqs_lvl2={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                            flow_gqs_lvl3={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                            flow_gqs_lvl4={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                    except: 
                        pass 
                    if flow_gqs_lvl2['cnt'][0]<0: 
                        flow_gqs_lvl2['cnt'][0]=0 
                    if flow_gqs_lvl2['size'][0]<0: 
                        flow_gqs_lvl2['size'][0]=0 
                    if flow_gqs_lvl3['cnt'][0]<0: 
                        flow_gqs_lvl3['cnt'][0]=0 
                    if flow_gqs_lvl3['size'][0]<0: 
                        flow_gqs_lvl3['size'][0]=0 
                    if flow_gqs_lvl4['cnt'][0]<0: 
                        flow_gqs_lvl4['cnt'][0]=0 
                    if flow_gqs_lvl4['size'][0]<0: 
                        flow_gqs_lvl4['size'][0]=0 
                    self.cluster_flow.append(flow_gqs_lvl4) 
                except Exception as e: 
                    flow_gqs_lvl2={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                    flow_gqs_lvl3={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                    flow_gqs_lvl4={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                try: #call 
                    x=call_base['call count'] 
                    calliqr2=(call_base['call count'].quantile(0.8)-
call_base['call count'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                    call_gqs_lvl2 = [call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.2)-calliqr2,call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.8)+calliqr2] 
                    calliqr3=(call_base['call count'].quantile(0.7)-
call_base['call count'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
                    call_gqs_lvl3 = [call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.3)-calliqr3,call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.7)+calliqr3] 
                    calliqr4=(call_base['call count'].quantile(0.6)-
call_base['call count'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
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                    call_gqs_lvl4 = [call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.4)-calliqr4,call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.6)+calliqr4] 
                    #gg=tgt_day 
                    try: 
                        if np.isnan(call_gqs_lvl4[0]): 
                            call_gqs_lvl2=[0,0] 
                            call_gqs_lvl3=[0,0] 
                            call_gqs_lvl4=[0,0] 
                    except Exception as e: 
                        print("broke",e) 
                    if call_gqs_lvl2[0]<0: 
                        call_gqs_lvl2[0]=0 
                    if call_gqs_lvl3[0]<0: 
                        call_gqs_lvl3[0]=0 
                    if call_gqs_lvl4[0]<0: 
                        call_gqs_lvl4[0]=0 
                except Exception as e: 
                    gg=0 
                    call_gqs_lvl2=[0,0] 
                    call_gqs_lvl3=[0,0] 
                    call_gqs_lvl4=[0,0] 
                try: 




                    #diagnostic 
                    """try: 
                        if gg: 
                            if hour==16: 
                                print(self.quantiles[hour]) 
                                print() 
                    except: 
                        pass""" 
                except Exception as e: 
                    print("GQS Generation Issue initial") 
                    print(e) 
            else: #existing data 
                try: ########### LOGIN/LOGOUT 
                    if ((y[0] ==[]) or (y[0]==0)): 
                        if day_log[hour]==[]: 
                            day_log[hour][0] #break it here so data 
isn't lost 
                        self.baseline[hour][0]=day_log[hour] 
                        try: 
                            login_base=day_log[hour] 
                            x=login_base['login'] 
                            lniqr2=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.8)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                            loiqr2=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.8)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.2))*1.5 






                            lniqr3=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.7)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
                            loiqr3=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.7)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.3))*1.5 





                            lniqr4=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.6)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                            loiqr4=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.6)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.4))*1.5 





                        except: 
                            
login_gqs_lvl2={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                            
login_gqs_lvl3={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                            
login_gqs_lvl4={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                except: 
                    ################################ 
                    #combine with previous baselines 85/15 
                    #update baseline for hour 
                    ################################ 
                    try: 
                        compare=self.baseline[hour] 
                        login_base=compare[0] 
                        x=login_base['login'] 
                        lniqr2=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.8)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                        loiqr2=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.8)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.2))*1.5 





                        lniqr3=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.7)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
                        loiqr3=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.7)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.3))*1.5 






                        lniqr4=(login_base['login'].quantile(0.6)-
login_base['login'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                        loiqr4=(login_base['logout'].quantile(0.6)-
login_base['logout'].quantile(.4))*1.5 





                        mix_log_df=day_flows[hour] 
                        mix_lniqr2=(mix_log_df['login'].quantile(0.8)-
mix_log_df['login'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                        mix_loiqr2=(mix_log_df['logout'].quantile(0.8)-
mix_log_df['logout'].quantile(.2))*1.5 





                        mix_lniqr3=(mix_log_df['login'].quantile(0.7)-
mix_log_df['login'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
                        mix_loiqr3=(mix_log_df['logout'].quantile(0.7)-
mix_log_df['logout'].quantile(.3))*1.5 





                        mix_lniqr4=(mix_log_df['login'].quantile(0.6)-
mix_log_df['login'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                        mix_loiqr4=(mix_log_df['logout'].quantile(0.6)-
mix_log_df['logout'].quantile(.4))*1.5 





                        index=0 
                        for event,mix_event in 
login_gqs_lvl2,mix_gqs_lvl2: 
                            index=0 
                            for x,y in event,mix_event: 
                                if x==y: 
                                    index+=1 
                                    pass 
                                else: 
                                    x=x*.85 
                                    y=y*.15 
                                    z=x+y 
                                    login_gqs_lvl2[event][index]=z 
                                    index+=1 
                        index=0 
                        for event,mix_event in 
login_gqs_lvl3,mix_gqs_lvl3: 
                            index=0 
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                            for x,y in event,mix_event: 
                                if x==y: 
                                    index+=1 
                                    pass 
                                else: 
                                    x=x*.85 
                                    y=y*.15 
                                    z=x+y 
                                    login_gqs_lvl3[event][index]=z 
                                    index+=1 
                        index=0 
                        for event,mix_event in 
login_gqs_lvl4,mix_gqs_lvl4: 
                            index=0 
                            for x,y in event,mix_event: 
                                if x==y: 
                                    index+=1 
                                    pass 
                                else: 
                                    x=x*.85 
                                    y=y*.15 
                                    z=x+y 
                                    login_gqs_lvl4[event][index]=z 
                                    index+=1 
                    except Exception as e: 
                        login_gqs_lvl2={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                        login_gqs_lvl3={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                        login_gqs_lvl4={'login':[0,0],'logout':[0,0]} 
                try: ########### FLOW 
                    if ((y[1] ==[]) or (y[1]==0)): 
                        if day_flows[hour]==0: 
                            day_flows[hour][1]#break it here 
                        self.baseline[hour][1]=day_flows[hour] 
                        try: 
                            compare=self.baseline[hour] 
                            flow_base=compare[1] 
                            x=flow_base['flow count'] #dies here if no 
values 
                            cntiqr2=(flow_base['flow 
count'].quantile(0.8)-flow_base['flow count'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                            sizeiqr2=(flow_base['flow 
size'].quantile(0.8)-flow_base['flow size'].quantile(.2))*1.5 





                            cntiqr3=(flow_base['flow 
count'].quantile(0.7)-flow_base['flow count'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
                            sizeiqr3=(flow_base['flow 
size'].quantile(0.7)-flow_base['flow size'].quantile(.3))*1.5 






                            cntiqr4=(flow_base['flow 
count'].quantile(0.6)-flow_base['flow count'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                            sizeiqr4=(flow_base['flow 
size'].quantile(0.6)-flow_base['flow size'].quantile(.4))*1.5 





                            if np.isnan(flow_gqs_lvl4['cnt'][0]): 
                                
flow_gqs_lvl2={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                                
flow_gqs_lvl3={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                                
flow_gqs_lvl4={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                        except: 
                            flow_gqs_lvl2={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                            flow_gqs_lvl3={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                            flow_gqs_lvl4={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                except: 
                    ################################ 
                    #combine with previous baselines 85/15 
                    #update baseline for hour 
                    ################################ 
                    try: 
                        try: 
                            compare=self.quantiles[hour] 
                            if compare[1]==0: 
                                compare=self.baseline[hour] 
                        except: 
                            compare=self.quantiles[hour] 
                            
x=self.baseline[hour][1].append(day_flows[hour]) 
                            self.baseline[hour][1]=x 
                        flow_base=compare[1] 
                        mix_flow_df=day_flows[hour] 
                        try: 
                            try: 
                                mix_flow_df['flow count'] 
                                mix_cntiqr2=(mix_flow_df['flow 
count'].quantile(0.8)-mix_flow_df['flow count'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                                mix_sizeiqr2=(mix_flow_df['flow 
size'].quantile(0.8)-mix_flow_df['flow size'].quantile(.2))*1.5 






                                mix_cntiqr3=(mix_flow_df['flow 
count'].quantile(0.7)-mix_flow_df['flow count'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
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                                mix_sizeiqr3=(mix_flow_df['flow 
size'].quantile(0.7)-mix_flow_df['flow size'].quantile(.3))*1.5 






                                mix_cntiqr4=(mix_flow_df['flow 
count'].quantile(0.6)-mix_flow_df['flow count'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                                mix_sizeiqr4=(mix_flow_df['flow 
size'].quantile(0.6)-mix_flow_df['flow size'].quantile(.4))*1.5 






                                
x=self.baseline[hour][1].append(day_flows[hour]) 
                                self.baseline[hour][1]=x 
                            except: 
                                # empty input 
                                print("flow mix",e) 
                                mix_gqs_lvl2={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                                mix_gqs_lvl3={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                                mix_gqs_lvl4={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                            flow_gqs_lvl2=flow_base[0] 
                            flow_gqs_lvl3=flow_base[1] 
                            flow_gqs_lvl4=flow_base[2] 
                            for event in flow_gqs_lvl2: 
                                for mix_event in mix_gqs_lvl2: 
                                    if event==mix_event: 
                                        gqs_values=flow_gqs_lvl2[event] 
                                        
mix_values=mix_gqs_lvl2[mix_event] 
                                        low_gqs=gqs_values[0] 
                                        high_gqs=gqs_values[1] 
                                        low_mix=mix_values[0] 
                                        high_mix=mix_values[1] 
                                        if low_gqs==low_mix: 
                                            low=low_gqs 
                                            if low<0: 
                                                low=0 
                                        else: 
                                            low_gqs=low_gqs*.85 
                                            low_mix=low_mix*.15 
                                            low=low_gqs+low_mix 
                                            if low<0: 
                                                low=0 
                                        if high_gqs==high_mix: 
                                            high=high_gqs 
                                        else: 
                                            high_gqs=high_gqs*.85 
                                            high_mix=high_mix*.15 
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                                            high=high_gqs+high_mix 
                                        flow_gqs_lvl2[event]=[low,high] 
                                    else: 
                                        pass 
                            index=0 
                            for event in flow_gqs_lvl3: 
                                for mix_event in mix_gqs_lvl3: 
                                    if event==mix_event: 
                                        gqs_values=flow_gqs_lvl3[event] 
                                        
mix_values=mix_gqs_lvl3[mix_event] 
                                        low_gqs=gqs_values[0] 
                                        high_gqs=gqs_values[1] 
                                        low_mix=mix_values[0] 
                                        high_mix=mix_values[1] 
                                        if low_gqs==low_mix: 
                                            low=low_gqs 
                                            if low<0: 
                                                low=0 
                                        else: 
                                            low_gqs=low_gqs*.85 
                                            low_mix=low_mix*.15 
                                            low=low_gqs+low_mix 
                                            if low<0: 
                                                low=0 
                                        if high_gqs==high_mix: 
                                            high=high_gqs 
                                        else: 
                                            high_gqs=high_gqs*.85 
                                            high_mix=high_mix*.15 
                                            high=high_gqs+high_mix 
                                        flow_gqs_lvl3[event]=[low,high] 
                                    else: 
                                        pass 
                            index=0 
                            for event in flow_gqs_lvl4: 
                                for mix_event in mix_gqs_lvl4: 
                                    if event==mix_event: 
                                        gqs_values=flow_gqs_lvl4[event] 
                                        
mix_values=mix_gqs_lvl4[mix_event] 
                                        low_gqs=gqs_values[0] 
                                        high_gqs=gqs_values[1] 
                                        low_mix=mix_values[0] 
                                        high_mix=mix_values[1] 
                                        if low_gqs==low_mix: 
                                            low=low_gqs 
                                            if low<0: 
                                                low=0 
                                        else: 
                                            low_gqs=low_gqs*.85 
                                            low_mix=low_mix*.15 
                                            low=low_gqs+low_mix 
                                            if low<0: 
                                                low=0 
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                                        if high_gqs==high_mix: 
                                            high=high_gqs 
                                        else: 
                                            high_gqs=high_gqs*.85 
                                            high_mix=high_mix*.15 
                                            high=high_gqs+high_mix 
                                        flow_gqs_lvl4[event]=[low,high] 
                                    else: 
                                        pass 
                        except: 
                            pass 
                        if np.isnan(flow_gqs_lvl4['cnt'][0]): 
                            flow_gqs_lvl2={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                            flow_gqs_lvl3={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                            flow_gqs_lvl4={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                    except Exception as e: 
                        print('flow update',e) 
                        flow_gqs_lvl2={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                        flow_gqs_lvl3={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                        flow_gqs_lvl4={'cnt':[0,0],'size':[0,0]} 
                try: ########### CALLS 
                    #y[2]=self.baseline[b_day][hour] calls 
                    if ((y[2]==[]) or (y[2]==0)): #nothing there 
                        if day_calls[hour]==[]: #also nothing 
                            day_calls[hour][2] #break here and all 0s 
                        self.baseline[hour][2]=day_calls[hour] 
                        try: 
                            compare=self.baseline[hour] 
                            call_base=compare[2] 
                            x=call_base['call count'] 
                            calliqr2=(call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.8)-call_base['call count'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                            call_gqs_lvl2 = [call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.2)-calliqr2,call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.8)+calliqr2] 
                            calliqr3=(call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.7)-call_base['call count'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
                            call_gqs_lvl3 = [call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.3)-calliqr3,call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.7)+calliqr3] 
                            calliqr4=(call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.6)-call_base['call count'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                            call_gqs_lvl4 = [call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.4)-calliqr4,call_base['call 
count'].quantile(0.6)+calliqr4] 
                            if np.isnan(call_gqs_lvl4[0]): 
                                call_gqs_lvl2=[0,0] 
                                call_gqs_lvl3=[0,0] 
                                call_gqs_lvl4=[0,0] 
                            print(call_gqs_lvl4) 
                        except: 
                            print("broken call update",e) 
                            call_gqs_lvl2=[0,0] 
                            call_gqs_lvl3=[0,0] 
                            call_gqs_lvl4=[0,0] 
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                except: 
                    ################################ 
                    #combine with previous baselines 85/15 
                    #update baseline for hour 
                    ################################ 
                    try: 
                        try: 
                            compare=self.quantiles[hour] 
                            if compare[2]==0: 
                                compare=self.baseline[hour] 
                        except: 
                            compare=self.quantiles[hour] 
                            
x=self.baseline[hour][2].append(day_calls[hour]) 
                            self.baseline[hour][2]=x 
                        call_base=compare[2] 
                        mix_call_df=day_calls[hour] 
                        try: 
                            try: 
                                mix_call_df['call count'] 
                                mixiqr2=(mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.8)-mix_call_df['call count'].quantile(.2))*1.5 
                                mix_gqs_lvl2 = [mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.2)-mixiqr2,mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.8)+mixiqr2] 
                                mixiqr3=(mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.7)-mix_call_df['call count'].quantile(.3))*1.5 
                                mix_gqs_lvl3 = [mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.3)-mixiqr3,mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.7)+mixiqr3] 
                                mixiqr4=(mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.6)-mix_call_df['call count'].quantile(.4))*1.5 
                                mix_gqs_lvl4 = [mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.4)-mixiqr4,mix_call_df['call 
count'].quantile(0.6)+mixiqr4] 
                                
x=self.baseline[hour][2].append(day_calls[hour]) 
                                self.baseline[hour][2]=x 
                            except: 
                                mix_gqs_lvl2=[0,0] 
                                mix_gqs_lvl3=[0,0] 
                                mix_gqs_lvl4=[0,0] 
                            call_gqs_lvl2=call_base[0] 
                            call_gqs_lvl3=call_base[1] 
                            call_gqs_lvl4=call_base[2] 
                            if call_gqs_lvl2[1]==0: 
                                if mix_gqs_lvl2[0]==0: 
                                    call_gqs_lvl2=[0,0] 
                            else: 
                                call_low=call_gqs_lvl2[0]*.85 
                                call_high=call_gqs_lvl2[1]*.85 
                                mix_low=mix_gqs_lvl2[0]*.15 
                                mix_high=mix_gqs_lvl2[1]*.15 
                                if call_gqs_lvl2[0]==mix_gqs_lvl2[0]: 
                                    low=call_gqs_lvl2[0] 
79 
                                else: 
                                    low=call_low+mix_low 
                                if call_gqs_lvl2[1]==mix_gqs_lvl2[1]: 
                                    high=call_gqs_lvl2[1] 
                                else: 
                                    high=call_high+mix_high 
                                if low<0: 
                                    low=0 
                                call_gqs_lvl2=[low,high] 
                            if call_gqs_lvl3[1]==0: 
                                if mix_gqs_lvl3[0]==0: 
                                    call_gqs_lvl3=[0,0] 
                            else: 
                                call_low=call_gqs_lvl3[0]*.85 
                                call_high=call_gqs_lvl3[1]*.85 
                                mix_low=mix_gqs_lvl3[0]*.15 
                                mix_high=mix_gqs_lvl3[1]*.15 
                                if call_gqs_lvl3[0]==mix_gqs_lvl3[0]: 
                                    low=call_gqs_lvl3[0] 
                                else: 
                                    low=call_low+mix_low 
                                if call_gqs_lvl3[1]==mix_gqs_lvl3[1]: 
                                    high=call_gqs_lvl3[1] 
                                else: 
                                    high=call_high+mix_high 
                                if low<0: 
                                    low=0 
                                call_gqs_lvl3=[low,high] 
                            if call_gqs_lvl4[1]==0: 
                                if mix_gqs_lvl4[0]==0: 
                                    call_gqs_lvl4=[0,0] 
                            else: 
                                call_low=call_gqs_lvl4[0]*.85 
                                call_high=call_gqs_lvl4[1]*.85 
                                mix_low=mix_gqs_lvl4[0]*.15 
                                mix_high=mix_gqs_lvl4[1]*.15 
                                if call_gqs_lvl4[0]==mix_gqs_lvl4[0]: 
                                    low=call_gqs_lvl4[0] 
                                else: 
                                    low=call_low+mix_low 
                                if call_gqs_lvl4[1]==mix_gqs_lvl4[1]: 
                                    high=call_gqs_lvl4[1] 
                                else: 
                                    high=call_high+mix_high 
                                if low<0: 
                                    low=0 
                                call_gqs_lvl4=[low,high] 
                            if np.isnan(call_gqs_lvl4[0]): 
                                call_gqs_lvl2=[0,0] 
                                call_gqs_lvl3=[0,0] 
                                call_gqs_lvl4=[0,0] 
                        except Exception as e: 
                            pass 
                    except Exception as e: 
                        print('call update',e) 
80 
                        #something bad happened, preserve old bls? 
                        call_gqs_lvl2=[0,0] 
                        call_gqs_lvl3=[0,0] 
                        call_gqs_lvl4=[0,0] 
                try: 




                except Exception as e: 
                    print("GQS Generation Issue after",e) 
        day_log=0 
        day_flows=0 
        day_calls=0 
        date_log=0 
        date_flows=0 
        date_calls=0 
        hour_log=0 
        hour_flows=0 
        hour_calls=0 
        #print(self.quantiles) 
        with open("%s" % self.addr,"a+") as fi: 
            dt=datetime.datetime.now() 
            try: 
                print("\nData for %d-%d-%d\nBaseline: " % 
(dt.day,dt.month,dt.year),file=fi) 
                print(self.baseline, file=fi) 
                print("Quantile: ",file=fi) 
                print(self.quantiles, file=fi) 
                print("Days: ",file=fi) 
                print(self.data,file=fi) 
            except: 
                print("All fucked %s" % self.addr) 
                pass 
        #get size of self 
        self.size=0 
        try: 
            for date in self.data: 
                self.size+=sum(sys.getsizeof(hour) for hour in 
self.data[date].keys()) 
                self.size+=sum(sys.getsizeof(val) for val in 
self.data[date].values()) 
        except Exception as e: 
            print("Issue getting days size:") 
            print(e) 
        try: 
            self.size+=sum(sys.getsizeof(hour) for hour in 
self.baseline.keys()) 
            self.size+=sum(sys.getsizeof(val) for val in 
self.baseline.values()) 
        except Exception as e: 
            print("Issue getting baseline size: ") 
            print(e) 
        try: 
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            self.size+=sum(sys.getsizeof(hour) for hour in 
self.quantiles.keys()) 
            self.size+=sum(sys.getsizeof(val) for val in 
self.quantiles.values()) 
            self.size+=sys.getsizeof(self.cluster_flow) 
            self.size+=sys.getsizeof(self.cluster_log) 
        except Exception as e: 
            print("Issue getting quantile size or cluster input size: 
") 
            print(e) 
        self.clear() 
 
    def clear(self): 
        #self.monday.clear() 
        #self.tuesday.clear() 
        #self.wednesday.clear() 
        #self.thursday.clear() 
        #self.friday.clear() 
        #self.saturday.clear() 
        #self.sunday.clear() 
        #self.threat_score=0 
        self.data.clear() 
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